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I. INTRODUCTION
The ambivalence and conflict of social policies aimed at
controlling youthful deviance are most apparent when confronting persistent or violent young offenders., The justifications for intervening in the lives of young offendersretribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation-suggest contradictory social policies. 2 The juvenile court as a special institution for controlling youthful deviance is based on the
obvious notion that youthful offenders are young as well as offenders. 3 Juveniles' immaturity, as reflected in common law in1. See generally P. STRASBURG, VIOLENT DELINQUENTS (1978); TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS,
CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME (1978) [hereinafter cited as CONFRONTING YOUTH
CRIME]; Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative to Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L REV. 515
(1978).
2. One commentator has observed that
the reformers generally rejected deterrence and retribution as adequate notions to justify criminal sanctions. A criminal law based on
such principles had failed to suppress crime and was cruel to individuals because of its failure to individualize treatment. Certainly such a
harsh, poorly conceived system should no longer be applied to children.... The rules of criminal responsibility, based on what seemed
to be an outmoded conception of "free will," were thought unsuited to
the progress appropriate to the new century, and certainly could have
no proper application to children .... Children were considered educable and reformable.
Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The ConstitutionalContext of Juvenile Cases,
1966 Sup. CT. REV. 167, 169. See generally F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRne,NAL JUSTICE 25-41 (1964).
3. There have been various interpretations of the development of the juvenile justice system. See generally L EMPEY, JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE PROGREssrvE LEGACY AND CURRENT REFORMS (1979); A. PLATr, TEE CamDsAvEns
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fancy defenses, 4 lessens their culpability for criminal acts.
Moreover, responsibility for youthful misconduct may be
widely distributed because the obligations to socialize and
educate young persons, and to teach them moral values and
respect for the law, are shared by their families and communities. 5 Statistics suggest that low-level delinquency is often a
symptom of adolescence that will be outgrown in most instances. 6 Accordingly, the juvenile justice system with its underlying rationale of rehabilitation seeks to protect young
offenders from the stigma of conviction through treatment and
supervision, procedural informality, and confidentiality.
Nevertheless, the victims of criminal acts suffer the same
injuries, regardless of the age of the perpetrators. Satisfying
the individual and societal needs for retribution when juveniles
perpetrate crimes may conflict, however, with the ideal of regenerative intervention. Similarly, punitive approaches to deter other offenders require the publicity and visibility of
(2d ed. 1977); D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE (1980); E. RYERSON,
THE BEST-LAID PLANS (1978); Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An HistoricalPerspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L.
REV. 104 (1909).
4. Since criminal liability is premised on rational actors who make blameworthy choices and are responsible for the consequences of their acts, the common law recognized and exempted from punishment categories of persons who
lacked the requisite moral and criminal responsibility. See generally J. HALT,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw (2d ed. 1960); Westbrook, Mens Rea in
the Juvenile Court, 5 J. FAro. L. 121 (1965). Children less than seven years of
age were conclusively presumed to be without criminal capacity, while those
fourteen years of age and older were treated as fully responsible. Between the
ages of seven and fourteen years, there was a rebuttable presumption of criminal incapacity. See W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, CRmINmAL LAw 351 (1972); Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 659, 660 (1970); see
also Platt & Diamond, The Origins of the "Right and Wrong" Test of Criminal
Responsibility and Its Subsequent Development in the United States: An Historical Survey, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1227, 123347 (1966). This common law doctrine
has continuing validity despite the development of the juvenile court and its
departure from common law concepts of crime. Juvenile court delinquency jurisdiction still requires a consideration of the child's capacity to commit a
crime. See In re Gladys R., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 862-67, 464 P.2d 127, 132-36, 83 Cal. Rptr.
671, 676-80 (1970); see also In re Winburn, 32 Wis. 2d 152, 164-67, 145 N.W.2d 178,
184-85 (1966).
5. Because society is responsible for educating and socializing the young,
society may also share some of the blame for a youth's criminal acts that result
from a failure to fullill these obligations. See TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME

226-28 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]. See also CONFRONTING
YOUTH CRIME, supra note 1, at 66.
6. Zimring, American Youth Violence: Issues and Trend, in CRME AND
JUSTICE (N. Morris & M. Tonry eds. 1979); Feld, supra note 1, at 531 n.56.
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intervention and punishment,7 yet these requirements are inconsistent with traditionally informal and confidential juvenile
proceedings. Finally, while juvenile crime rates 8 may indicate a
need to incapacitate young offenders to prevent future crimes, 9
this need conflicts with policies intended to minimize the loss
of liberty to young offenders.
Juvenile courts have traditionally assigned primary importance to individualized treatment of juvenile offenders on the
theory that the interests of both offenders and society are best
served by regenerative treatment. The criminal law applicable
to adults accords far greater significance to the offense committed and attempts to proportion punishment.' 0 The differences
between the two systems become most visible when the competing policies of juvenile and criminal courts intersect in juvenile certification proceedings.
The disposition of sophisticated, persistent, or violent juvenile offenders poses one of the most difficult issues in the administration of the juvenile justice process. This small but
important class of youths challenges both the rehabilitative assumptions of the juvenile court and the propriety of informal,
nonpunitive, and relatively short-term social control." These
offenders are typically older youths, frequently recidivists, and
usually near the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction.12
7. See Feld, supra note 1, at 607-12.
8. The crime statistics indicate that juvenile perpetration of major crimes
peaks in mid- to late adolescence. See CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME, supra note
1, at 35-43; M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO, & T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT 251 (1972) [hereinafter cited as M. WOLFGANG]. Cf. FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATIONS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED

STATES: 1978, 194-96 (1979) (perpetration of major property crimes peak in midto late adolescence) [hereinafter cited as F.B.L CRIME REPORTS]; Zimring,
supra note 6, at 72 (perpetration of major property crimes peak in mid- to late
adolescence).
9. See Boland & Wilson, Age, Crime, and Punishment, 51 Pun. IrEREST
22, 25, 32-34 (1978). Contra, Zimring, supra note 6, at 95-97.
10. See generally H.L-A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968); N.
MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); H. PACKER, THE IZMITs OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968); H.M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 401 (1958).
11. Feld, supra note 1, at 517-18. See CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME, supra
note 1, in which the authors concluded that
[n]o single age during mid-adolescence should be used as a sharp dividing line for sentencing policies. We have considered sentencing policy toward young offenders in both juvenile and criminal courts and
recommend coordinating the policies of these two institutions so that
public policy toward young offenders is based on consistent and coherent premises.
Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted).
12. See Schornhorst, The Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: Kent Re-
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Although chronologically juveniles, their criminal conduct is indistinguishable from that of adult offenders. Moreover, there is
increasing evidence that this small class of youthful offenders
accounts for a disproportionately large amount of the total volume of serious crime committed by juveniles.13
Legislatures have adopted mechanisms to transfer juvenile
offenders from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts to the jurisdiction of adult criminal courts.14 These transfer mechanisms allow legislatures to retain a high maximum age of
juvenile court jurisdiction while simultaneously removing to
adult criminal courts those youths whose highly visible, serious, or repetitive criminality raises legitimate concern for public safety or community outrage. Yet, the jurisdictional waiver
process continues to be one of the most troublesome aspects of
visited, 43 IND. L.J. 583, 592 (1968); Note, Problem of Age and Jurisdictionin the
Juvenile Court, 19 VAND. L. REV. 833, 858 (1966);.cf. Keiter, Criminal or Delinquent? A Study of Juvenile Cases Transferredto the Juvenile Court, 19 CRIME &
DELINQUENcY 528, 531, 537 (1973) (while 75% of cases studied were recidivists,
the average age of the juvenile offenders tried as adults was fifteen and one
half years of age).
13. Wolfgang found that for virtually all purposes, the most significant differences in the frequency and seriousness of delinquencies occurred between
those juveniles in his sample with one or two delinquencies and those with five
or more. M. WOLFGANG, supra note 8, at 88-105.
These chronic offenders represent only around 6 percent of the entire
birth cohort and 18 percent of the delinquent group; yet this small
group of 627 were responsible for 5,300 delinquencies, or 52 percent of
all such acts committed by the entire birth cohort. They were heavily
represented among those who committed violent offenses; about 55 percent of all the offenses we designated violent were committed by this
small group of 62Z They were responsiblefor 71 percent of the robberies
and for all the homicides. The other offenses committed by most of the
other delinquents in the birth cohort were relatively trivial, and when
we tried to grade them (i.e., weight them in some way by a seriousness
score that we had worked out earlier), the differences between the
hard core-the chronic small group of 627-and the others became even
more dramatic.
Wolfgang, Contemporary Perspectives on Violence, in VIOLENCE AND CRInINAL
JUSTICE 7 (D. Chappel & J. Monohan eds. 1975) (emphasis added). See also P.
STRASBRG, supra note 1, at 43-76; D. Hm'PARAN, 1R ScHUSTER, S. Dnmrz, & J.
CONRAD, THE VIoLENT FEw 5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as D. HAMPAmRA].
14. The procedures for removing juvenile offenders from the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court for prosecution as adult offenders are known by a variety of
terms, including reference or certification for adult prosecution and waiver, decline, or transfer of juvenile court jurisdiction. These mechanisms subject a
chronological juvenile to criminal prosecution as an adult. Virtually every jurisdiction provides some mechanism to prosecute juveniles in adult criminal
proceedings. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1976); Aim. CONsT. art. 6, § 15 (1910,
amended 1960); ALA. CODE § 12-15-34 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060 (1979);
Am-- STAT. ANN. §§ 45-417, -420 (1977 & Supp. 1979); CAL WELF. & INST. CODE
§§ 707-707.4 (West Supp. 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-1-104(4) (a)-(c), -3-108
(1973). See also D. HAPAjAN, supra note 13, at 134-35; Feld, supra note 1, at
523-24 n.22.
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juvenile justice administration in Minnesota 5 and other states.
Juvenile courts rely on clinical evaluations to determine a
youth's amenability to treatment or dangerousness: a reliance
that raises issues concerning the validity of clinical predictions
and the propriety of delegating questions of social policy to the
discretionary judgments of social service personnel and judges.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has considered several aspects of the jurisdictional waiver process,16 and the legislature
has recently amended several provisions of the juvenile code
affecting the juvenile transfer decision.' 7 This Article examines
these changes to determine if the procedural or substantive issues raised by transfer have been satisfactorily resolved and to
evaluate how well each change conforms to the revised purpose
of the juvenile code. The Article concludes that while the legislature's adoption of specific, substantive offense criteria
designed to guide juvenile court judges in the administration of
the transfer statute may marginally change the number of
youths referred to adult criminal courts, the reforms are not responsive to the fundamental conceptual and administrative difficulties posed by the transfer process. Furthermore, the
combined effects of the juvenile code amendments and the recent changes in the sentencing provisions of the adult criminal
code may make the certification process even more cumbersome and difficult to administer. Finally, in light of these conclusions, the Article considers whether the maintenance of a
separate juvenile justice system remains justified.
II.

WAIVER MECHANISMS

There are two principal mechanisms for transferring juve15. The Minnesota Supreme Court has considered a number of aspects of
the transfer process in recent years. See generally In re S.R.J., 293 N.W.2d 32
(Minn. 1980); In re T.D.S., 289 N.W. 2d 137 (Minn. 1980), In re Dahl, 278 N.W.2d
316 (Minn. 1979); In re J.B.M., 263 N.W.2d 74 (Minn. 1978); State v. Duncan, 312
Minn. 17, 250 N.W.2d 189 (1977); In re I.Q.S., 309 Minn. 78, 244 N.W.2d 30 (1976);
In re J.E.C., 302 Minn. 387, 225 N.W.2d 245 (1975), State v. Hogan, 297 Minn. 430,
212 N.W.2d 664 (1973). The Minnesota Supreme Court has appointed a Juvenile
Justice Study Commission to advise it on certification issues and other matters.
16. See note 15 supra; notes 65-86 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 87-109 infra and accompanying text. An earlier article analyzed the transfer issues and concluded that statutes requiring discretionary
judicial determinations of a youth's amenability to treatment or dangerousness
are fundamentally flawed in conception and unworkable in practice. See Feld,
supra note 1, at 523-56. Additionally, the author proposed specific legislative
changes to address these problems, including a redefinition of juvenile court jurisdiction to exclude youthful offenders with certain combinations of present
offenses and prior records. See id. at 556-85.
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nile offenders to the adult criminal justice process.' 8 The most
common mechanism is judicial waiver-a judge may waive juvenile court jurisdiction after a judicial hearing on the youth's
amenability to treatment or threat to public safety.19 The alter18.

See Whitebread & Batey, TransferBetween Courts: Proposalsof the Ju-

venile Justice Standards Project, 63 VA. L. REV. 221, 229-31 (1977).

Cf. Note,

Rights and Rehabilitationin the Juvenile Court, 67 COLJM. L. REV. 281, 310-20
(1967) (four transfer mechanisms: judicial, reverse-i.e., the criminal judge remands to juvenile court,-legislative, and prosecutorial).
Prosecutorial waiver is a third mechanism for removing serious offenders
from the juvenile system. See Mlyniec, Juvenile Delinquentor Adult ConvictProsecutor'sChoice, 14 AM. Cinm. L. REV. 29, 32 (1976); Stamm, Transfer of Jurisdictionin Juvenile Court: An Analysisfor the Proceeding,Its Role in the Administrationof Justice, and a Proposalfor the Reform of Kentucky Law, 62 Ky.
L. REV. 122, 138 (1973). Although legislative offense exclusion, mandating adult
prosecution of juveniles charged with certain offenses, is sometimes referred to
as prosecutorial waiver, "pure" prosecutorial waiver vests the prosecutor's office with discretion in making the transfer decision. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 43-202.01 (1978). See generally Comment, Due Process, Equal Protection and
Nebraska'sSystem Allowing the County Prosecutorto Determine Whether a Juvenile Will be Tried as an Adult, 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 223 (1974). Variations on
the prosecutorial waiver mechanism exist in a number of states. For example,
in Florida, the prosecutor's decision to seek a grand jury indictment rather than
filing a juvenile court petition can result in a youth's prosecution as an adult.
See Johnson v. State, 314 So.2d 573, 577 (Fla. 1975); FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5) (b)-(c)
(Supp. 1980).
Because the prosecutor's discretion is unreviewable and there are no
guidelines for making these jurisdictional determinations, the prosecutorial
waiver has been criticized extensively. See, e.g., Mlyniec, supra at 36, 57; Note,
Youthful Offenders and Adult Courts: ProsecutorialDiscretion vs Juvenile
Rights, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1184, 1191 (1973). Every objection to the discretionary
bases of judicial waiver is equally applicable to prosecutorial decisions.
Prosecutorial waiver is the least common transfer mechanism, and its use
appears to be disfavored. Federal delinquency proceedings, which formerly relied on prosecutorial waiver, now employ judicial waiver to deal with serious
juvenile offenders. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5032 (1976). Under the former provisions, acts punishable by death or life imprisonment were excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction, and the attorney general had discretion to transfer any
youth not otherwise excluded. See Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 336-37
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869 (1973). Under the revised statute, a judicial
transfer hearing is mandated. Such hearings are the most vulnerable to constitutional challenge. See, e.g., Coates v. Johnson, 597 P.2d 328, 329-30 (Okla. 1979)
(statute which may "confer discretion on the prosecutor to determine where to
file" unconstitutionally vague).
19. For a discussion of judicial waiver, see notes 23-53 infra. Forty-six
states and the federal courts outside of the District of Columbia employ judicial
waiver to make some or all transfer decisions. In 28 states and the federal jurisdictions, judicial transfer is the only mechanism for adult prosecution. See
authorities cited in Feld, supra note 1, at 523 n.22. Virtually all of the commentators, professional organizations, and advisory councils support judicial
waiver. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 410, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1957);
INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, AmEmcAN BAR Ass'N, JUvENILE JUSTICE
STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS §§ 2.1-2.4 at
27-56 (1980) [hereinafter cited as TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS STANDARDS];
TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, JUVENILE Jus-
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native mechanism is legislative waiver-the legislature redefines juvenile court jurisdiction to exclude from juvenile courts
those youths charged with certain offenses. 20 The judicial and
legislative waivers are essentially different ways of asking and
answering the same questions:
who are the serious, hard-core youthful offenders, on what basis are
they identified, and how shall the juvenile and adult systems respond
to them? Each mechanism emphasizes different information in determining whether certain juvenile offenders should be handled as adults.
Judicial waiver, through its focus on the offender, reflects the rehabilitative values of the juvenile court, while legislative exclusion, with its
primary emphasis on the offense, reflects the values of the criminal
law. 2 1

Although commentators and legislatures overwhelmingly favor
the judicial mechanism, a legislative redefinition of juvenile
court jurisdiction provides a more objective and administratively superior method of identifying which chronological
juveniles are "adults" for purposes of prosecution under the
criminal law.22

A. JUDICIAL WAIVER
Waiver for adult prosecution is the most significant dispositional decision of the juvenile court; the United States Supreme
Court and most state supreme courts are confronted with litigation surrounding this decision more than any other type of juvenile court proceeding. 23 In Kent v. United States,24 the
TICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 303-05 (1976); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 5, at 24-25.
20. For a discussion of legislative waiver, see notes 54-64 infra. The procedural and substantive issues raised by the prosecution of juvenile offenders as
adults have been analyzed extensively. See generally Browne, Guidelinesfor
Statutes for Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court, 4 PEPPERDINE L REV. 479
(1977); Dixon, Juvenile Justice in Transition,4 PEPPERDINE L REV. 469 (1977);
Edwards, The Casefor Abolishing Fitness Hearingsin Juvenile Court,17 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 595 (1977); Sorrentino & Olsen, Certificationof Juveniles to Adult
Court, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 497 (1977); Whitebread & Batey, supra note 18;
Note, Wisconsin's New Juvenile Waiver Statute: When Should We Wave Goodbye to Juvenile Court Protections,1979 Wis. L. REV. 190; Comment, Juvenile Justice in California: Changing Concepts?, 7 Am. J. Clum. L. 171 (1979); Comment,
The § 707 FitnessHearing: An Argument for Retribution and Reform, 12 U. CAL.
D.L. REV. 851 (1979). See also Feld, supra note 1, at 522 n.21.
21. Feld, supra note 1, at 523.
22. See id.
23. Although juvenile court jurisdiction over an adjudicated offender may
continue for the duration of the youth's minority, this period is significantly
shorter than the sentence of twenty years to life imprisonment that may be imposed if a juvenile is tried as an adult for a serious felony. Moreover, juveniles,
unlike adults, enjoy private proceedings, confidential records, and protection
from the stigma of a criminal conviction. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 556-57 (1966).
24. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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Supreme Court mandated that procedural due process be observed in judicial waiver determinations. 2 Subsequently in
Breed v. Jones,26 the Court applied the double jeopardy provisions of the Constitution to juvenile adjudications, thereby requiring a state to make its dispositional determinationwhether to treat an offender as a juvenile or as an adultbefore proceeding against the youth on the merits of the peti27
tion or complaint.
Although Kent was decided on procedural grounds, the
Supreme Court in dicta appended some of the substantive criteria that a juvenile court judge might properly consider in deciding if he or she should waive jurisdiction.28 It is this
25. The Supreme Court concluded that the loss of the special juvenile
court protections through a waiver decision was a "critically important" action
that required a hearing, assistance of counsel, access to social investigations
and other records, and written findings and conclusions capable of review by a
higher court. Id. at 554-57. "[T] here is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony-without
hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons." Id. at 554. See generally Paulsen, supra note 2; Schornhorst, supra note
12.
26. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
27. Id. at 539-40.
28. An offense falling within the statutory limitations ... will be
waived if it has prosecutive merit and if it is heinous or of an aggravated character, or-even though less serious-if it represents a pattern of repeated offenses which indicate that the juvenile may be
beyond rehabilitation under Juvenile Court procedures, or if the public
needs the protection afforded by such action.
The determinative factors which will be considered by the Judge in
deciding whether the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over such offenses
will be waived are the following.
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and
whether the protection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially
if personal injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment....
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one
court when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are
adults....
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by
consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude
and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous
contacts with the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies,
juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to
this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have
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substantive issue-on what bases the decisions are made-that
poses the principal difficulty of discretionary judicial waiver.
Incorporating the Kent factors in various linguistic formulae,
most jurisdictions provide for waiver on the basis of a court's
assessment of a youth's treatment prognosis or threat to public
safety, as indicated by the seriousness of the present offense,
cumulative record, or prior criminal actiity.29 Until the recent
committed the alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services and
facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 app. (1966).
29. The amenability to treatment or dangerousness factors in waiver decisions are defined with various degrees of specificity by courts and legislatures.
Typically, courts have elaborated on these conclusory standards by specifying
factors relevant to fitness assessments.
The California Supreme Court, while conceding that the statutory standards (i.e., not amenable to treatment and not a fit and proper subject to be
handled within the juvenile process) "lack explicit definition," ruled that
"'[tihe factors upon which an unsuitability finding is based are generally those
which indicated a relatively poor prognosis for rehabilitation."' Donald L. v.
Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 592, 601, 498 P.2d 1098, 1104, 102 CaL Rptr. 850, 856
(1972) (quoting People v. Smith, 5 Cal. 3d 709, 714, 91 Cal. Rptr. 600, 605, 478 P.2d
32, 37 (1971)). The California courts have filled in statutory gaps with a catalogue of considerations appropriate to the waiver decision: the minor's past
record of delinquency and behavior pattern, his or her amenability to treatment, and the nature of and circumstances surrounding the alleged criminal
act. See Jimmy H. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 709, 714-16, 478 P.2d 32, 36-56, 91
Cal. Rptr. 600, 603-04 (1970).
Other courts have employed similar strategies and criteria. See People v.
Moseley, 566 P.2d 331, 333 (Colo. 1977) (standards set forth in COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-3-108(2) (b) (1973)); Clemons v. State, 162 Ind. App. 50, 56, 317 N.E.2d 859,
863 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859 (1975) (standard "for the child's welfare
and the best interests of the State"); State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 916, 500 P.2d
209, 217 (1972) (three criteria: mental maturity, incorrigibility, and dangerousness); State v. Speck, 242 N.W.2d 287, 293 (Iowa 1976) (Kent criteria); State v.
Smagula, 377 A.2d 608, 611 (N.H. 1977) (Kent criteria); Mikulovsky v. State, 54
Wis. 2d 699, 704-08, 196 N.W.2d 748, 751-53 (1972) (Kent criteria).
Legislatures, struggling with the Kent criteria, have provided some additional guidance to waiving courts. Some have directed the courts to assess the
offender's amenability to treatment within the time remaining for juvenile
court jurisdiction. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-48(c) (West Supp. 1979) ("no
reasonable prospects for rehabilitation of the juvenile prior to his attaining the
age of majority by use of the procedures, services and facilities available to the
court"). Legislatures sometimes have instructed the courts to consider the success of prior treatment efforts. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 1215-34(d) (3) (1977)
("[t] he nature of past treatment efforts and the nature of the child's response
to such efforts"). Determinations of amenability have been based upon the
availability of treatment facilities within the juvenile justice system. See, e.g.,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-808(b) (6) (Supp. 1979) ("Whether the child would be amenable to the care, treatment and training program for juveniles available
through the facilities of the court"). Courts are at times instructed to explore
the possibility of civil commitment as an alternative to waiver. See, e.g., AIA.
CODE § 1215-34(c) (1977) ("[w]hen there are grounds to believe that the child is
committable to an institution or agency for the mentally retarded or mentally
ill"). Several jurisdictions also include a catch-all amenability factor based on
the child's demeanor, home environment, living patterns, or attitude. See, e.g.,
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legislative amendments, Minnesota was typical of the jurisdictions in which the legislature provided only minimal direction
to the judiciary. Waiver was authorized if the court concluded
either that the youth was not suitable to treatment or that a
disposition within the juvenile system would pose a threat to
public safety.30
The recent Minnesota legislative amendments were
adopted in recognition of the futility of uniformly and objectively determining a youth's amenability to treatment or dangerousness. 3 1 Legislation instructing a court to determine a
FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2) (c) (6) (1975) ("[t]he sophistication and maturity of the
child as determined by consideration of his home, environmental situation,
emotional attitude, and pattern of living").
The public safety, or dangerousness, criterion is sometimes elaborated to
require an examination of the circumstances or seriousness of the present offense. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2)(C)(2)-(3) (1975) ("[w]hether the alleged
offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner" and "[w]hether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if
personal injury resulted"). Legislatures also have instructed courts to consider
the juvenile's prior record. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 38-808(b) (5) (Supp. 1979)
("record and previous history of the child").
30. The Juvenile Court Act, ch. 685, § 16, 1959 Minn. Laws 1284 (amended
1980), provided that the juvenile court could refer the child for adult prosecution only if it "finds that the child is not suitable to treatment or that the public
safety is not served under the provisions of laws relating to juvenile courts."
See also MINN. Juv. CT. R. 8-7(2) (a) (d) (criteria relevant to determining amenability or dangerousness includes (1) the type of offense; (2) whether the offense is part of a repetitive pattern; (3) the record of the child; and (4) the
relative suitability of programs and facilities available to the juvenile and criminal courts) (MiNN. STAT. § 480.0595 (1980) directs the state supreme court to
promulgate new juvenile court rules).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has said that the following factors should
be considered to determine whether the public safety would be threatened by a
retention of jurisdiction:
(1) The seriousness of the offense in terms of community protection;
(2) the circumstances surrounding the offense; (3) whether the offense
was committed in an aggressive, violent, premediated, or willful manner; (4) whether the offense was directed against persons or property;
(5) the reasonably forseeable consequences of the act-, and (6) the absence of adequate protective and security facilities available to the juvenile treatment system.
State v. Hogan, 297 Minn. 430, 438, 212 N.W.2d 664, 669-70 (1973).
31. The difficulty of making waiver decisions was noted in In re Dahl, 278
N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1979), where the court said, "[U]nfortunately, the standards
for referral adopted by present legislation are not very effective in making this
important determination." Id. at 318. The court went on to note that
[d]ue to these difficulties in making the waiver decision, many juvenile
court judges have tended to be overcautious, resulting in the referral
of delinquent children for criminal prosecution on the erroneous, albeit
good faith, belief that the juveniles pose a danger to the public. Accordingly, a re-evaluationof the existing certificationprocess may be in
order.
Id. at 319 (emphasis added). See also notes 33-38 infra and accompanying text.
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youth's amenability to treatment presupposes the existence of
treatment programs that will systematically improve the social
adjustment of some juvenile offenders, classification systems
that will differentiate the rehabilitative responsiveness of various youths, and the availability of validated and reliable diagnostic tools and indicators that will enable a clinician or
juvenile court judge to determine in which class a particular
youth belongs. 32 These are all problematic assumptions.
The first criteria for waiver-a youth's amenability to treatment-involves several of these assumptions. Although the debate over the efficacy of therapeutic intervention strategies
continues, 3 3 it is clear that some youths persist in criminal misconduct even after treatment. There are no clinical factors,
however, that indicate with certainty whether a particular
youth will continue to engage in criminal behavior. All of the
problems associated with the validity and reliability of psychological or psychiatric classification and diagnosis 34 are com32. See Feld, supra note 1, at 533-35.
33. Compare D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON, & J. WILKS, THE EFFECrrVENESS OF
CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT 25-298 (1975) and Martinson, What Works?--Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22, 25 (1974) with
Gendreau & Ross, Effective Correctional Treatment: Bibliotherapyfor Cynics,
25 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 463, 469 (1979). See generally D. GLASER, THE EFFEcTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM (1964); D. MANN, INTERVENING WITH
CONVICTED SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS (1976); D. WARD, D. WILNER, & G.
KASSENBAUM, PRISON TREATMENT AND PAROLE SURVIVAL (1971); L. WKINs,
EVALUATION OF PENAL MEASURES (1969); Adams, Evaluative Research in Corrections: Status and Prospects,38 FED. PROBATION 14 (1974); Fishman, An Evaluation of Criminal Recidivism in Projects ProvidingRehabilitationand Diversion
Services in New York City, 68 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283 (1977); Gold, A
Timefor Skepticism, 20 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 20 (1974); Palmer, MartinsonRevisited, 12 J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQUENCY 133 (1975); Robison & Smith, The
Effectiveness of CorrectionalPrograms,17 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 67 (1971).
34. The problem of clinical diagnosis of a youth's amenability to treatment
is one aspect of the validity and reliability problems of psychiatric diagnoses in
general. For example, when dealing with the questions of validity and reliability of psychiatric diagnoses of "conventional" mental illness, as distinguished
from "delinquency," most studies examining the diagnoses find consistency in
classification in only half the cases or less. See generally Arnhoff, Some Factors
Influencing the Unreliabilityof ClinicalJudgments, 10 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY
272 (1954); Ash, The Reliability of PsychiatricDiagnoses,44 J. ABNORMAL & SoCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 272 (1949); Beck, Reliability ofPsychiatricDiagnoses: A Critique of Systematic Studies, 119 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 210 (1962); Beck, Ward,
Mendelson, Mock, & Erbough, Reliability of PsychiatricDiagnoses: A Study of
Consistency of Clinical Judgments and Ratings, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 351
(1962); Brown, Lawyers and Psychiatrists in the Court: Afterword, 32 Mn. L.
REV. 36 (1972); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatryand the Presumptionof Expertise:
Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAUIF. L. REV. 693 (1974); Foulds, The Reliability of Psychiatric, and the Validity of Psychological Diagnoses, 101 J.
MENTAL SCI. 851 (1955) (now BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY); Kendell, The Stability of
PsychiatricDiagnoses,124 BrT. J. PSYCHIATRY 352 (1974); Rosenhan, On Being

1980]

JUVENILE CO URT REFORM

pounded when the questions involve troublesome legal and
social policy issues rather than scientific ones. 35 Most juvenile
amenability statutes require juvenile court judges to evaluate a
youth's amenability to treatment despite the absence of: substantial evidence that serious delinquents respond to coercive
intervention, behavioral categories that distinguish serious offenders who are and who are not responsive to intervention,
and validated, objective indicators that allow individual diagnostic classification of amenable and nonamenable serious of36
fenders.
The alternative basis for waiver requires a juvenile court to
37
predict a youth's threat to public safety, or dangerousness.
The evidence is overwhelming that reliable identification of a
dangerous person assumes "a capacity to predict future criminal behavior quite beyond our present technical ability."38 The
lack of reliable psychological or clinical indicators to predict
dangerousness almost invariably results in over predicting and
erroneously classifying as dangerous many young offenders
who ultimately do not commit further offenses.
While predicting dangerousness is an inherently imprecise
and inaccurate enterprise, different methodologies--clinical
and actuarial-are available with varying degrees of reliability.
To determine a juvenile's potential for committing additional
dangerous crimes, clinicians in most juvenile courts review
whatever information is available to develop "some psychologiSane in Insane Places,179 SCL 250 (1973); Tarter, Templer, & Hardy, Reliability
of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 36 DISEASES OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM 30 (1975);
Waldo & Dinitz, PersonalityAttributes of the Criminab An Analysis of Research
Studies, 1950-65, 4 J. RESEAR CH CRIME & DELINQUENCY 185 (1967).
35. Ennis and Litwack, supra note 34, provide a very thorough review of
the literature regarding the reliability and validity of psychiatric diagnoses, including the factors that detract from consistency. They conclude that:
Human behavior is difficult to understand, and, at present, impossible to predict. Subject to constitutional limitations, the decision to deprive another human of liberty is not a psychiatric judgment but a
social judgment. We shall have to decide how much we value individual freedom; how much we care about privacy and self-determination;
how much deviance we can tolerate-or how much suffering. There are
no "experts" to make those decisions for us.
Id. at 752.
36. See Feld, supra note 1, at 535.
37. For a discussion of "dangerousness," see id. at 540-46.
38. N. Momus, supra note 10, at 62. See Feld, supra note 1, at 541 n.80
(compilation of studies concluding that prediction of dangerousness is a difficult, futile, and dangerous exercise). See generally DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR: A
PROBLEM IN LAw AND MENTAL HEALTH (C. Frederick ed. 1978); S.P. PFOHL, PREDICTING DANGEROUSNESS (1978); Underwood, Law and the Crystal BalL Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE
LJ. 1408 (1979).
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cal hypothesis regarding the structure and dynamics of [the]
particular individual. On the basis of this hypothesis and certain reasonable expectations as to the course of outer events,
[they] arrive at a prediction of what is going to happen."3 9
A more reliable methodology would use actuarial or statistical tables based on the empirically observed relationships between independent predictor variables-age, prior offenses,
race, and the like-and the behavior to be predicted. 40 Using
such tables, a judge need only determine which predictor variables are present in the individual in order to classify him or
her and then locate on the tables the probabilities of the behavior to be predicted. While clinical judgments rely upon presumed professional expertise and subjective assessments to
predict behavior, actuarial predictions use more objective indicators and correlational statistical tables to make aggregate
predictive judgments. Increased reliance on actuarial prediction techniques is evidenced by the statistical tables used in a
variety of predictive dispositional contexts. Perhaps the most
dramatic instance of this increased reliance is the shift from indeterminate sentencing and clinically based release decisions
to determinate or presumptive sentencing that relies on statistical tables to compute an offender's probabilities of recidivism
4
and length of sentence. 1
39.

P. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION 4 (1954).

40. The clear-cut superiority of actuarial methods over clinical methods of
predicting future behavior is especially striling in light of the uncertainties and
inconsistencies typically associated with social science research.
[0] ne should not simply assume that "intensive, clinical, psychological
understanding of the individual" leads generally to more trustworthy
forecast of behavior than a more behavioristic-actuarial approach to
the predictive task. .

.

. The comparative efficacy of different methods

of predicting behavior is, of course, a factual question; and in spite of
the armchair plausibility of the above metioned assumptions .... there
exists a very sizable body of empirical evidence to the contrary....
Of some five dozen published and unpublished research studies known
to us, there is only a single study showing, given an acceptable research design, a clearcut superiority of clinical judgment over actuarial
prediction.... It would be difcult to mention any other domain of social science research in which the trend of the data is so uniformly in
the same direction, so that any psychiatristor psychologist who disfavors the objective, actuarialapproach in a practical,decision-making
context should be challenged to show hisfamiliaritywith this research
literature and invited to rebut the theoretical argument and empirical
evidencefound therein.
Livermore, Malmquist, & Meehl, On the Justificationsfor Civil Commitment, 117
U. PA. L. REV. 75, 76-77 n.4 (1968) (emphasis added).
41. See Coffee, The Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability Predictability,and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEo. LJ. 975,
1105 (1978); Zalman, The Rise and Fallof the Indeterminate Sentence, 24 WAYNE
L. REV. 45, 84-87 (1977); MNmEsOTA SENTENCING GUmEmNES ComuanssioN, RE-
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Minnesota's recently adopted presumptive sentencing
guidelines are representative of this trend. 42 Typical of the actuarial method of dispositions, these sentencing guidelines consist of a two-dimensional table with the vertical axis rating the
severity of the present offense and the horizontal axis reflecting
the offender's prognosis rating or likelihood of recidivism. The
use of both the present offense and other recidivism prediction
variables in sentencing reflects the tension between dispositions aimed at retribution and those aimed at incapacitating
43
the potentially dangerous.
This tension between policy goals raises an additional issue: which variables should be included in the predictive component of the table? Choosing the variables is a two-step
process: first, offender characteristics that correlate with the
outcome criterion-violence, recidivism, and the like-must be
identified, and second, those factors that should be included in
the prediction scheme must be selected.44 Some offender characteristics such as sex, race, age, education, or employment
may correlate with predictor outcomes, but their inclusion in
such tables raises substantial legal and policy issues. 45 In conPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE (1980) 26-38 [hereinafter cited as 1980 SENTENCING
GUIDELINES].

42. See generally 1980 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 41.
43. See id. at 9-10; Coffee, supra note 41, at 991. The movement in the adult
criminal process away from rehabilitation as a justification for intervention toward dispositions based on "just deserts" has had both academic support and
legislative success. See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR
JUSTICE 145-53 (1971); D. FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF 260-72 (2d ed. 1979);
N. MORRIS, supra note 10, at 14-18; A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 49-55 (1976).
See generally E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRMNALS (1975); J. WILSON, THINING ABOUT CRIME (1975); Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution-An Examination of Doing Justice, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 781.
The justice model rejects individualized treatment and rehabilitation as
justifications for coercive intervention because of the problems in the latter approach: discretionary power vested in presumed experts; the inability of such
experts to empirically justify differential treatment of similarly situated offenders; and the inequalities and injustices resulting from individualized treatment.
The justice model, with its retributive bases, punishes offenders according to
their actions rather than according to who they are or what they are predicted
to become.
Determining the weight to assign to incapacitation based on predicted recidivism and deserved retributive punishment involves a difficult moral and
policy dilemma. As the Minnesota Sentencing Guideline Commission noted,
the length of punishments based "on a just deserts philosophy would increase
more rapidly with offense severity than with prior criminal record, whereas incapacitation-oriented durations would increase much more rapidly with prior
criminal record than with offense severity." 1980 SENTENCING GUIDELINES,
supra note 41, at 11.
44. See generally Coffee, supra note 41.
45. Id. It has been observed that
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trast to the use of these characteristics, a history of previous
46
violations is the most reliable predictor of future violations.
Moreover, the acquisition of a prior record is a variable that is
subject to the control of the offender in ways that social characteristics are not.47 Not surprisingly, juvenile court judges are
most influenced by a record of prior offenses and a serious
48
present offense when making waiver decisions. The seriousness of the offense and the past history of the youth should be
the only bases of waiver decisions. These bases could be implemented either through the use of tables like those contained
in the sentencing guidelines or directly through legislative redefinition of juvenile court jurisidiction.
At present, judicial waiver is not generally based on statistical tables. Instead, typical waiver statutes, couched in terms
of "amenability to treatment" or "dangerousness," are in effect
[f] actors other than a juvenile's present offense or prior history of offenses also appear to correlate with the probability of future violence
or other official criminal misconduct. Age, sex, race, and socioeconomic
status are the most obvious correlates with official delinquency. In
purely probabilistic predictive terms, lower-class, non-white, adolescent males, as an aggregate, have a substantially greater probability of
official criminal involvement than do, for example, white, middle-class
women aged thirty and over. For obvious reasons, however, many factors with marginal predictive relevance cannot provide a legal basis for
actuarial prediction. There would, for example, be an equal protection
problem with certifying a black juvenile but not a white one, even if it
were demonstrated that, statistically, blacks as a class have a greater
probability of subsequent criminal involvement than do whites. Moreover, despite the statistical relationships between factors such as sex,
age, class, and race and criminal involvement, these factors are all beyond the control of the juvenile. They are not his fault, and it would be
inappropriate to punish an individual for that which he cannot change
or control.
Feld, supra note 1, at 544-45. The substantial issues associated with selecting
predictor criteria have been thoughtfully analyzed by Coffee, supra note 41.
46. A person's relevant past behaviors tend to be the best predictors of
his future behavior in similar situations. It is increasingly evident that
even simple, crude, demographic indices of an individual's past behaviors and social competence predict his future behavior at least as well
as, and sometimes better than, either the best test-based personality
statements or clinical judgments.
W. MISCHEL, PERSONAL=TY & ASSESSMENT 135 (1968).

47. This Article relies upon the same philosophical premises that the Sentencing Guidelines Commission worked from, i.e., that retribution and prevention through incapacitation are the principal justifications for penal
intervention. These premises concentrate on the seriousness of the offense as
evidence of culpability and on persistence of criminal conduct as evidence of
the likelihood of future offenses. Because of this emphasis on culpability and
the making of blameworthy choices, this Article rejects factors which might aid
predictive judgments such as age, race, sex, or class because they are characteristics for which the actor is not responsible.
48. See Note, Due Process and Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction,30
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 591, 598 (1973).
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broad, standardless grants of discretion. 4 9 The subjectivity inherent in the administration of waiver statutes permits a variety of inequalities to occur without any effective check on
courts' application of the statutes.5 0 While appellate courts
have been singularly unresponsive to various constitutional
challenges to juvenile waiver statutes, such as "void for vagueness," 5 1 the empirical reality is that judges are not capable of
49. For a general discussion of the scope of judicial discretion in waiver determinations, see Comment, Juveniles in the Criminal Courts: A Substantive
View of the FitnessDecision, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 988, 1001-04 (1976); Feld, supra
note 1, at 526-29. Appellate courts, like legislatures, typically refrain from specifying the determinative factors a waiving court must consider or from assigning
relative weights to those factors. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 537
(1975) ("the Court has never attempted to prescribe criteria for, or the nature
and quantum of evidence that must support, a decision to transfer a juvenile
for trial in adult court"); Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 370 Mass. 272, 282, 347
N.E.2d 667, 684 (1976) ("no specific requirement that a judge weight these factors in a certain manner or achieve some predesigned balance").
50. In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), the Supreme Court held
that a juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction over a youth must satisfy the basic
requirements of due process, as well as comply with the statutory mandate of a
"full investigation." A requirement of substantive stafidards supported by a
factual record susceptible to appellate review, provided at least part of the rationale for the Court's decision in Kent- "Meaningful review requires that the
reviewing court should review. It should not be remitted to assumptions. It
must have before it a statement of the reasons motivating the waiver including,
of course, a statement of the relevant facts." Id. at 561. See also People v.
Fields, 391 Mich. 206, 216, 216 N.W.2d 51, 66 (1964), rev'd sub nom. People v. Peters, 397 Mich. 360, 244 N.W.2d 898 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 944 (1976).
These criteria, used by lower courts when making waiver decisions, must
be clear before a reviewing court can evaluate a lower court's decision.
[U]ness statutory clarity exists, other guarantees of procedural due
process cannot be meaningful. Typical procedural due process requirements such as written notice of charges, a hearing with an opportunity
to present testimony to the hearing body, and a written decision containing the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the decision, may
be of little avail when a tribunal is free to apply its own standard of
what constitutes reasonable conduct.
Todd, Vagueness Doctrine in the Federal Courts: A Focus on the Military,
Prison, and Campus Contexts, 26 STAN. L REV. 855, 858-59 (1974) (citations
omitted). See ex rel. Pendrosa v. Sielaf, 434 F. Supp. 493, 495-96 (N.D. Ill. 1977),
modified, 598 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1979) (invalidating a transfer statute on ground
that "[w]here there are no standards to govern the exercise of [the judge's]
discretion, 'the scheme permits and encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement of the law ").
51. There have been very few successful challenges to juvenile waiver statutes. In People v. Fields, 388 Mich. 66, 199 N.W.2d 217 (1972), the court held the
waiver statute to be unconstitutional because it lacked standards a judge could
use when waiving jurisdiction. The court later reversed itself, however, agreeing with the dissent in Field that the court had the power to provide standards
that the statute lacked. See People v. Peters, 397 Mich. 360, 367-69, 244 N.W.2d
898, 901-02, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 944 (1976). Cf. Pedrosa v. Sielaf, 434 F. Supp.
493, 495-97 (N.D. Ill. 1977), modified, 598 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1979) (although court
held waiver statute unconstitutional because devoid of any standards for judge
to follow, the state legislature, subsequent to petitioner's transfer, amended the
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consistent, even-handed administration of these discretionary
statutes. Evidence exists that a juvenile's race may influence
waiver decisions 52 and that waiver statutes are inconsistently
53
interpreted and applied within a jurisdiction.
statute to include standards for waiver decisions); Coats v. Johnson, 597 P.2d
328, 329-30 (Okla. 1979) (waiver statute held unconstitutionally vague). Constitutional vagueness challenges to statutes permitting waiver in terms of "amenability to treatment" or "the best interests of the child or the public" have
been singularly unsuccessful. See Jimmy H. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 709,
714, 478 P.2d 32, 35, 91 Cal. Rptr. 600, 603 (1970); Clemons v. State, 162 Ind.App.
50, 56, 317 N.E.2d 859, 863 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859 (1975); State v. Hogan,
297 Minn. 430, 438, 212 N.W.2d 664, 669-70 (1973); Knott v. Langlois, 102 R.L 517,
523, 231 A.2d 767, 770 (1967); Mikulovsky v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 699, 704-08, 196
N.W.2d 748, 751-53 (1972).
Courts have salvaged waiver statutes by reading the Kent criteria, see note
29 supra,into their statutes as a judicial gloss. See generally People v. Moseley, 193 Colo. 256, 566 P.2d 331 (1977); Clemons v. State, 162 Ind. App. 50, 317
N.E.2d 859 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859 (1975); State v. Speck, 242 N.W.2d
287 (Iowa 1976); State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 377 A.2d 608 (1977); State v.
Doyal, 59 N.M. 454, 286 P.2d 306 (1955); State v. Williams, 75 Wash. 2d 604, 453
P.2d 418 (1969); Mikulovsky v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 699, 196 N.W.2d 748 (1972).
Courts have also used, for additional guidance, the general purpose clause of
the enabling legislation creating the juvenile court. See generally State v.
Owens, 197 Kan. 212, 416 P.2d 259 (1966); Lewis v. State, 86 Nev. 889, 478 P.2d 168
(1970); State ex rel. Salas, 520 P.2d 874 (Utah 1974); In re Burtts, 12 Wash. App.
564, 530 P.2d 709 (1975); In re F.R.W., 61 Wis. 2d 193, 212 N.W.2d 130 (1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 974 (1974).
52. See Hays & Solway, The Role of Psychological Evaluation in Certification of Juveniles for Trial as Adults, 9 Hous. L. REV. 709, 711 (1972); Keiter,
supra note 12, at 536. Keiter notes that
[a]rguably the racial breakdown of the sixty-four transferred youths
reveals subtle discrimination since the backgrounds of the nonblacks
indicated more serious criminal involvement than the backgrounds of a
portion of the removed blacks. But, in general, these data do not
clearly establish a pattern of racial discrimination and fail to prove outright abuse of the statutory discretion.
Id. at 537.
53. The Minnesota Supreme Court Juvenile Justice Study Commission
found pronounced differences in certification practices in urban and rural counties throughout Minnesota. SUPREME COURT JuvENIE JUSTICE STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT 61-78 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as SUPREME COURT STUDY]. According to the study, the reference or certification process is used for three different purposes or objectives in different parts
of the state:
In Hennepin County certifications are requested for youths who, in the
judgment of the office of the county attorney, represent substantial
threats to the public safety or cannot be effectively handled with the
resources currently available through the juvenile court process. This
purpose or objective is consistent with legislative intent in enacting the
enabling statute. A second purpose for which certification is utilized in
a number of courts is to attempt to insure that the offender will be subject to correctional or rehabilitative efforts beyond his 18th birthday.
Thus youths who are approaching their 18th birthday at the time of
their offense may be certified because some juvenile court judges feel
that a youth committed to the Commissioner of Corrections as a juvenile "automatically" will be released from state jurisdiction when he
turns 18. A third purpose for which certification is utilized is to allow
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LEGISLATIVE WAIVER-REDEFINING JUVENILE COURT
JURISDICTION TO EXCLUDE OFFENSES

Legislative waiver, the principal alternative to judicial
waiver, excludes from juvenile court jurisdiction offenders who
are charged with certain offenses or who have particular
records of prior adjudications in conjunction with a present offense. 54 Since juvenile courts are statutory entities, legislatures can modify their jurisdiction.55 Despite both due process
and equal protection challenges to statutes excluding certain
offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction, courts have consistthe imposition of a sanction such as a fine or short jail sentence upon
juveniles who committed relatively minor offenses and who, it is felt,

are not in need of probation or other treatments available through the
juvenile court.
Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added). The use of certification to impose adult crimes
on minor juvenile offenders is one of the issues addressed by the juvenile code
provisions that now permits fines to be assessed in juvenile courts.
Feld, supra note 1, reports that
[aln analysis of waiver decisions in a sample of counties throughout
Minnesota showed that urban offenders considered for certification had
generally committed more serious offenses and had more extensive
prior records than their rural counterparts. In addition to more recorded offenses, certified urban youths had records extending over a
longer period of time and more appearances on delinquency petitions
than did rural youths. Yet, despite the substantially greater seriousness of the present offense and the longer and more extensive prior
records of urban youths, rural youngsters were much more likely to be
certified for adult prosecution.
Id. at 552 (citations omitted). The problem of county by county disparity in administration is not confined to Minnesota. Similar disparities have been reported in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 20, at 611-12.
54. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1570A(5) (West Supp. 1980) (adult
prosecution of "a child who, after having become fifteen years of age, is charged
with having committed a capital crime"). Some states exclude only capital offenses or those punishable by life imprisonment. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
§ 39.02(5) (c) (1944 & Supp. 1980). Other jurisdictions exclude broader categories of offenses, see, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2301(3) (1973), or youths charged with
repeat offenses, see, e.g., R.L GEN. LAws § 14-1-7.1 (Supp. 1979). Several jurisdictions supplement their judicial waiver provisions with legislative offense exclusions. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-1-103(9), -1-104, -3-108 (1973).
55. See United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973) (Congress could have established the age cutoff at age
16). The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that
[w] hile there would probably be almost universal agreement that it is
desirable for a State to maintain a juvenile court and to establish special facilities for the treatment of a separate category of 'Juvenile delinquents", we are aware of nothing in the constitution of the United
States or of this State that requires a State to do so.
People v. Jiles, 43 IIl. 2d 145, 148, 251 N.E.2d 529, 531 (1969). Accord, People v.
Bombacino, 51 Ill. 2d 17, 20, 280 N.E.2d 697, 699, cert denied, 409 U.S. 912 (1972);
State v. Green, 218 Kan. 438, 442, 544 P.2d 356, 361 (1975) ("legislature could...
withhold the protection of the doctrine of parenspatriaefrom all juveniles exceeding fifteen years of age. What the legislature may do absolutely, it may do
conditionally").
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56
ently sustained the legislative classifications.
Statutes mandating adult prosecution on the basis of the
seriousness of the offense charged, rather than on the basis of
the characteristics of the offender, are inconsistent with the rehabilitative philosophy of juvenile courts. Although legislatures may subordinate individualized treatment considerations
to other social control policy objectives, they have often failed
to make clear which of several alternative policies were being
adopted in redefining juvenile court jurisdiction. A legislature
could rationally conclude that an older youth who commits a

56. See generally Woodard v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1088 (1978); Russel v. Parratt, 543 F.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Quinones, 516 F.2d 1309 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 852
(1975); Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869
(1973); United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 909 (1973); Myers v. District Court, 184 Colo. 81, 518 P.2d 836 (1974); Johnson v. State, 314 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1975); People v. Sprinkle, 56 Ill. 2d 257, 307
N.E.2d 161, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 935 (1974); State v. Sherk, 217 Kan. 726, 538
P.2d 1390 (1975); Jackson v. State, 311 So. 2d 658 (Miss. 1975); State v. Grayer,
191 Neb. 523, 215 N.W.2d 859 (1974). See also Feld, supra note 1, at 556-71; Vitiello, Constitutional Safeguardsfor Juvenile Transfer Procedure: The Ten
Years Since Kent v. United States, 76 DE PAUL L. REV. 23, 47-52 (1976); Note,
supra note 48, at 601-07.
The due process claim is directed at the nonreviewability of the charging
decision and the prosecutor's exercise of discretion in removing youths from
the juvenile court. The argument for procedural parity between the judicial
waiver hearings required by Kent, see notes 23 & 28 supra, and the prosecutorial charging decisions under legislative offense exclusion is based on the
similarity of consequences for the youth. Courts have consistently rejected the
argument that the comparable consequences flowing from judicial and legislative waivers require comparable procedural safeguards by noting that exercises
of prosecutorial discretion are not subject to judicial review or due process constraints except under manifestly discriminatory circumstances. See United
States v. Bland, 472 F.2d at 1335-36 (1973). In a challenge to a "pure"
prosecutorial waiver statute, see note 18 supra, the court in Cox v. United
States, 473 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 909 (1973), specifically
rejected procedural safeguards as a precondition to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The judicial reluctance to review prosecutorial decisions is
based on the constitutional principle of separation of powers. See
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); United States v. Bland, 472
F.2d 1329, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973); see also Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v. Cox, 342
F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); Feld, supra note 1, at
558 n.139; Note, Reviewability of ProsecutorialDiscretion: Failureto Prosecute,
75 CoLUM. L. REV. 130, 136-38 (1975).
The equal protection claim attacks the rationality of the legislative decision
to treat youths charged with certain offenses as adults rather than juveniles.
The courts have uniformly rejected such claims, noting that classification on
the basis of offense involves neither an inherently suspect class nor a preferred
freedom. As the majority in Bland noted, a legislative classification is entitled
to a strong presumption of constitutional validity as a means of dealing with a
problem uniquely within the legislative purview and should be invalidated only
if there is no rational basis to justify it. 472 F.2d at 1333-34.
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particularly heinous or serious offense deserves to be treated
as an adult, and could retributively exclude such a youth on the
basis of past culpability.5 7 Punishing solely on retributive
grounds, however, tends to over-punish because many youths
may only commit one serious offense and then cease to be
58
criminally active.
A second rationale for legislative waiver is incapacitation of
chronic offenders. A legislature could attempt to identify the
persistent offenders who require greater incapacitation than is
provided by the juvenile process. 59 If the legislative goal is to
incapacitate such offenders, then the commission of one serious offense is not the most reliable indicator. Persistent, violent offenders are legislatively distinguishable from their less
criminally active peers on the basis of their persistence in crim60
inal activity, not the seriousness of such activity. A first offense, even a serious one, is predictive of neither the
probability nor the seriousness of future offenses because
57. See Feld, supra note 1, at 564-65.
58. See, e.g., M. WOLFGANG, supra note 8, at 160. Another study found that
"the notion of progression from minor delinquency to violent offenses has -little
if any validity. The majority of our youths (54.6 percent) were arrested for violent offenses in their first police contact." D. HAMPARiAN, supra note 13, at 52.
Yet, this study found that nearly one-third of this sample had no subsequent
arrests, id. at 52, and that only about 15% of those youths with one arrest for
violence had a second arrest for violence. Id. at 54, table 4-2.
59. Feld, supra note 1, at 565. This latter policy is found in many jurisdictions' habitual offender statutes that provide enhanced sentences for recidivists. The United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of
such statutes. In Rummell v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133 (1980), the Court held that
the point at which a recidivist will be deemed to have demonstrated
the necessary propensities and the amount of time that the recidivist
will be isolated from society are matters largely within the discretion of
[T~he mandatory life sentence imthe punishing jurisdiction....
posed upon this petitioner does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 1145.
60. It has been observed that
[f]rom the available evidence regarding hidden delinquency and the
development of delinquent careers, it appears that many youths engage in both trivial and serious law violations at the same stage of their
careers and that police arrest and process youths primarily as a function of the frequency rather than the seriousness of an individual's delinquent involvements. Apprehension thus appears to be random,
resulting primarly from a youth's persistence. If this is true, then the
fact that a youth is apprehended for a serious offense may not distinguish him from a youth apprehended for a minor offense whose hidden
serious delinquency did not result in apprehension. Thus, the seriousness of an offense provides little basis for distinguishing those youths
who are not susceptible to rehabilitation and are likely to recidivate
from those for whom disposition as a juvenile is appropriate.
Feld, supra note 1, at 566-67.
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6
many first offenders have no further criminal involvement. '
The number of contacts a young offender has with the juvenile
justice system, however, is an accurate indicator of criminal
persistence. 62 While most youths desist after one or two involvements, once youths become chronic offenders there is a
substantial probability that they will continue in their delinquencies. 63 Thus, a legislature attempting to identify serious
offenders, whether for retributive or utilitarian reasons, should
do so on the basis of persistence rather than seriousness.6 4

61. See M. WOLFGANG, supra note 8, at 159-60. Offenders whose first arrest
was for a personal injury offense were nearly as likely to desist after one offense (43%) as were other types of first offenders. Id.
62. Id. at 88-105. See also D. HlAMPARiAN, supra note 13, at 128; P. STRASBURG, supra note 1, at 44-46.
63. M. WOLFGANG, supra note 8, at 162, table 10.3. See also Wolfgang, From
Boy to Man-From Delinquency to Crime in THE SEIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDER
166, table V (National Office for Social Responsibility ed. 1977). See also D.
HAmPARAN, supra note 13, at 53; P. STRASBURG, supra note 1, at 35-36.
In addition to Wolfgang's research, see note 8 supra, other research supports the conclusions that serious offenders are best identified by their persistence rather than the significance of their initial offense. A study in Columbus,
Ohio, of all youths born between 1956 and 1960 who had been arrested at least
once for a violent offense before their eighteenth birthday found that 29.5% of
the sample had been arrested only once in their juvenile careers, their initial
arrest had been for a violent offense, and they had desisted after only one incident of violence. See D. HAmPARIAN, supra note 13, at 52-53. Moreover, only
about 15% of those youths with one arrest for violence had a second arrest for
violence. Id. at 54. On the other hand, those juveniles who became chronic offenders, those with five or more arrests, also accounted for a disproportionate
amount of the serious offenses as well. Id. at 128.
Similar results were reported for a study of delinquents in New York. The
study found that "although 29 percent of the sample was charged at least once
with a serious violent crime, the proportion charged on more than one occasion
with serious violence is much smaller (6 percent) . . . This lends support to
the contention that delinquents who engage in violent crime do not usually do
so repeatedly." P. STRASBURG, supra note 1, at 35-36. The New York study also
concluded that
[v]iolent acts appear, for the most part, to be occasional occurrences
within a random pattern of delinquent behavior, rather than a "specialty" of juveniles. The number of delinquents who are chronically violent is quite small. Recidivists are responsible for the large majority
of violent offenses by juveniles, but it is not possible to predict violence
simply on the basis of prior offense records. On the other hand, the
best among many unreliable predictors of future violence is a prior
record of violence.
Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
64. The only valid basis for distinguishing chronic offenders from their
less persistent counterparts is the number of prior involvements....
[A] first offense, even a serious one, is not indicative of either future
offenses or their seriousness since most first offenders, including serious ones, are likely either to desist from further criminal involvement
entirely or to commit a nonindex, nonserious offense next ....
[RJegardless of the type of initial offenses, youths who will be persistent, chronic violators can be identified only after they have recidivated
Thus, utilitarian legislative waiver classifications
several times ....
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MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ACTIONS ON
CERTIFICATION-IN RE DAHL

In In re Dahl,65 the Minnesota Supreme Court confronted
procedural and substantive problems inherent in the juvenile
waiver process. Dahl, a youth seventeen years old at the time
of the alleged offense and eighteen years old at the time delinquency and certification proceedings were initiated, murdered
another youth with several shotgun blasts after taking him to a
66
remote area of northern Minnesota. Despite Dahl's virtues
and his lack of previous contacts with the juvenile justice system, 67 he was certified to stand trial as an adult on the grounds
that he was both unamenable to treatment and a threat to the
public safety. The reasons given for certifying Dahl were his
age, the seriousness of his alleged offense, and the concern that
he could not be adequately treated within the three years remaining under juvenile court jurisdiction. 68 The record upon
which the state's certification motion was granted contained
neither psychological or psychiatric information nor negative
information regarding the juvenile's background apart from the
alleged homicide. 69 The case, as presented to the Minnesota
Supreme Court, thus raised the relatively narrow issue of
whether a juvenile's age and the seriousness of the crime
charged satisfied the statutory requirements of nonamenability
or dangerousness.
In the earlier case of State v. Hogan,70 the court had indicated that the presence of several criteria, including consideration of the offense allegedly committed, allowed the lower court
must be designed to identify persistent delinquents who are also serious, rather than initially serious delinquents who may ultimately be
neither serious nor persistent offenders.
Feld, supra note 1, at 570-71 (emphasis in original). Accord, P. STRASBURG,
supra note 1, at 180.
65. 278 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1979).
66. Dahl was a high school senior, who maintained a B average, participated in interscholastic sports, planned to attend a nearby college, and was a
dependable worker at his various part-time jobs. The court commented, "It is
clearly apparent that [Dahl] is not the typical delinquent seen by the Juvenile
Court. This offense [first degree murder] . . . appears to be an isolated delinquent act. .. ." Id. at 317-18.
67. The only blemishes on Dahl's record were a two-day suspension from
school for swearing and kicking his locker when an expensive watch was stolen, and a 45-day driver's license suspension for reckless driving. Id. at 317.
68. Id. at 318. The waiving court's conclusion that Dahl could only receive
three years of treatment as a juvenile was based on MMn. STAT. § 260.181(4)
(1978).
69. 278 N.W.2d at 318.
70. 297 Minn. 430, 212 N.W.2d 664 (1973).

-190

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:167

to certify a youth on public safety grounds. 7 1 The Hogan
"threat to public safety" criteria were relied upon in subsequent cases in which the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the
certification of youths based on the offenses with which they
were charged. 72 The Hogan court referred to Mikulovsky v.
State,73 in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court allowed a
waiver solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense alleged. 74 The factual settings of Mikulovsky and Dahl are virtually indistinguishable. In In re JB.M.,75 the last certification
case considered by the Minnesota Supreme Court prior to
Dahl, the waiving judge construed the seriousness of the offense to mandate reference "if the offense is of a sufficiently
dangerous nature."7 6 The supreme court rejected that construction with the observation that "[a]lthough the nature of
the offense is certainly a factor to be considered in this determination and may serve as a basis for statutory reference...
this court has not held that reference is mandatory when a serious crime is involved." 77 The obvious corollary is that application of the Hogan criteria to the seriousness of the offense
would not preclude waiver on that ground alone.
The Dahl court, however, explicitly held that "the existing
statutory framework does not authorize referral based on the
specific crime charged.... this court did not intend the application of the Hogan factors to result in the referral of a juvenile
solely because of the alleged offense." 78 The court went on to
say that the offense charged was obviously "among the relevant
factors to be considered" 79 and "[t] he record must contain direct evidence that the juvenile endangers the public safety for
the statutory reference standard to be satisfied."80 The case
was thus remanded to the certifying court, which, in order to
recertify, had to include in the record evidence that the juvenile was not suitable to treatment or presented a threat to the
71. See note 30 supra.
72. See generally In re J.B.M., 263 N.W.2d 74 (Minn. 1977); State v. Duncan,
312 Minn. 17, 250 N.W.2d 189 (Minn. 1977).
73. 54 Wis. 2d 699, 196 N.W.2d 748 (1972).
74. Id. at 704-08, 196 N.W.2d at 751-53 (no prior contacts with juvenile authorities, no serious offense, no psychological or social testimony, but adherence to Kent offense criteria allows for discretionary waiver).
75. 263 N.W.2d 74 (Minn. 1978).
76. Id. at 75.
77. Id. at 76.
78. 278 N.W.2d at 321.
79. Id. (emphasis in original).
80. Id.
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public safety.8 1
The case, as decided, simply resolved the narrow issue of
what factual record is necessary to support a judicial determination of nonamenability to treatment or dangerousness and
concluded that proof of age and seriousness of the crime alone
are insufficient. In dicta, however, the court expressed serious
concerns about the adequacy of the current legislation and
clearly indicated to the legislature that the waiver criteria were
in need. of modification and greater specificity. 82 The court,
sensitive that judicial determinations of amenability or dangerousness resulted in decisions that were potentially erroneous
and prejudicial to juveniles, concluded that "[a] re-evaluation
of the existing certification process may be in order."83 The
sweeping language of the opinion, and the certification
problems posed by youths like Dahl who commit a particularly
serious offense without any prior contacts with the system,
prompted public concern and ultimately legislative action.
The certification problems presented in Dahl dramatically
highlight the conceptual inadequacy of judicial determinations
of amenability or dangerousness. The commission of one serious offense is not reliable evidence for predicting either future
offenses or amenability to treatment.84 While several courts
construing judicial waiver statutes have allowed the certification of youths solely on the basis of the seriousness of the present offense, 8 5 others have rejected waivers where "the juvenile
88
ha [d] no prior juvenile record."
Whether youths committing serious offenses should be
treated as juveniles or adults is ultimately a legislative question that involves difficult social policy choices concerning protection of youths and society, sentencing structures in the
juvenile and criminal justice systems, and the conceptual underpinnings of the juvenile justice system. There has been
substantial legislative activity in recent years as a number of
jurisdictions, including Minnesota, have re-examined their certification procedures and have experimented with a variety of
options.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 318.
83. Id. at 319.
84. See text accompanying notes 31-38 supra.
85. See, e.g., Mikulovsky v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 699, 702-04, 196 N.W.2d 748, 75053 (1972).
86. See, e.g., State v. D.W.C., 256 S.E.2d 894, 898 (W. Va. 1979).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:167

IV. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN THE MINNESOTA
JUVENILE CODE
During 1980, the Minnesota Legislature actively reviewed
the state's juvenile code and significantly amended and modified a number of interrelated provisions. Changes were directed at serious young offenders, the certification process, and
the interface between the juvenile and criminal courts in sentencing.
In what may prove to be one of the more far-reaching
changes, the legislature redefined the purpose of the juvenile
court. The previous purpose of the law was to secure "for each
minor ... the care and guidance, preferably in his own home,
as will serve the ... welfare of the minor and the best interests
of the state." 87 Under the new legislation, the exclusively benevolent and rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile court remains only for children "alleged or adjudicated neglected or
dependent." 88 For those youths charged with crimes, however,
[t]he purpose of the laws relating to children alleged or adjudicated to
be delinquent is to promote the public safety and reducejuvenile delinquency by maintainingthe integrity of the substantive law prohibiting
certain behavior and by developing individual responsibilityfor lawful
behavior.8 9

Maintaining the integrity of the substantive criminal law and
developing individual responsibility for lawful behavior marks
a fundamental philosophical departure from the previous rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile justice system to much more
explicitly punitive and social control purposes.
The legislature also modified the provisions governing certification. Under the prior law, a juvenile court could only order
87. Juvenile Court Act, ch. 685, § 1, 1959 Minn. Laws 1275 (repealed 1980)
provided in full:
The purpose of the laws relating to juvenile courts is to secure for each
minor under the jurisdiction of the court the care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will serve the spiritual, emotional, mental,
and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the state; to
preserve and strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from the custody of his parents only when his welfare or
safety and protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded
without removal; and, when the minor is removed from his own family,
to secure for him custody, care and discipline as nearly as possible
equivalent to that which should have been given by his parents. The
laws relating to juvenile courts shall be liberally construed to carry out
these purposes.
88. MiuINN. STAT. § 260.011(2) (1980).
89. Id. (emphasis added). The statute continues: '"This purpose should be
pursued through means that are fair and just, that recognize the unique characteristics and needs of children, and that give children access to opportunities
for personal and social growth." Id.
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a juvenile referred for adult prosecution if it concluded that
"the child is not suitable to treatment or that the public safety
is not served under the provisions of laws relating to juvenile
courts." 90 As amended, the statute mandates a probable cause
hearing on the alleged offense to provide a basis for the certification motion.9 1 The burden of proof in waiver proceedings
now rests on the prosecution to establish by "clear and convincing evidence" that the juvenile court jurisdiction should be
90. Juvenile Court Act, ch. 685, § 16, 1959 Minn. Laws 1284 (amended 1980).
See also MINN. Juv. CT. R. 8-1 to 8-8 (prescribing the hearing procedures in a
reference proceeding). The procedures for implementing these standards have
been spelled out in several decisions. State v. Hogan, 297 Minn. 430, 431, 212
N.W.2d 664, 669-70 (1973), described some of the substantive criteria a court
could use in finding a threat to public safety. See notes 70-81 supra and accompanying text.
The court in In re IQ.S., described the hearing procedures required in Minnesota under the standards enunciated in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541
(1966):
Four procedural safeguards, meeting due process requirements,
must attend all waiver proceedings:
(1) If the juvenile court is considering a waiver of jurisdiction, the juvenile is entitled to a hearing;
(2) The juvenile is entitled to representation by counsel at such hearing;
(3) The juvenile's attorney must be given access to the juvenile's social
record on request; and
(4) If jurisdiction is waived, the juvenile is entitled to a statement of
reasons in support of the waiver order.
244 N.W.2d 30, 36 (1976). In requiring a statement of reasons, the court emphasized the necessity of statements to facilitate appellate review:
[W] e would prefer--and think it is the responsibility of the juvenile
court-to have orders granting or denying reference accompanied by a
sufficient statement of the reasons for and considerations leading to
that decision. By this holding, we do not mandate that the statement
necessarily meet formal or conventional findings-of-fact requirements.
However, the statement should sufficiently demonstrate the court's full
investigation of the matter, that careful consideration has led to its decision, and upon which statutory basis the court has relied. Satisfaction of this requirement would afford this court more meaningful
review.
Id. at 38. These procedural requirements were reaffirmed in State v. Duncan,
250 N.W.2d 189 (Minn. 1977), where the court declined to constitutionally require a probable cause hearing, but suggested that "[wlhile the juvenile court
is not required to find probable cause, in the absence of other relevant grounds
for referral, such as past record, the court can and should consider in sufficient
detail the facts of the crime in order to justify-a referral for adult prosecution."
Id. at 197.
91. MINl. STAT. § 260.125(2) (d) (1980) provides that a juvenile court may
order a reference only if it finds that
(1) there is probable cause ... to believe the child committed the offense alleged by delinquency petition and
(2) the prosecuting authority has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the child is not suitable to treatment or that the public safety is not served under the provisions of laws relating to juvenile
courts.
Id. (emphasis added).
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waived. 92 The legislature retained, without change, the basic
waiver criteria of nonamenability to treatment and dangerousness.

93

A simple re-enactment of the nonamenability and dangerousness criteria would not be responsive to either the problems
inherent in the former waiver statute or the supreme court's directive in Dahl. Accordingly the legislature, purporting to give
greater guidance and direction to juvenile courts in administering the waiver provisions, added a third subdivision to the certification statute that allows a prosecutor to establish
[a] primafacie case that the public safety is not served or that the child
is not amenable for treatment ... if the child was at least 16 years of
age at the time of the alleged offense and:
(1) Is alleged by delinquency petition to have committed an aggravated
felony against the person and (a) in committing the offense, the child
acted with particular cruelty or disregard for the life or safety of another; or (b) the offense involved a high degree of sophistication or
planning by the juvenile; or
(2) Is alleged by delinquency petition to have committed murder in the
first degree; or
(3) Has been adjudicated delinquent for an offense committed within
the preceding 24 months, which offense would be a felony if committed
by an adult, and is alleged by delinquency petition to have committed
murder in the second or third degree, manslaughter in the first degree,
criminal sexual conduct in the first degee or assault in the first degree;
or
(4) Has been adjudicated delinquent for two offenses, not in the same
behavior incident, which offenses were committed within the preceding
24 months and which would be felonies if committed by an adult, and
is alleged by delinquency petition to have committed manslaughter in
the second degree, kidnapping, criminal sexual conduct in the second
degree, arson in the first degree, aggravated robbery, or assault in the
second degree; or
(5) has been previously adjudicated delinquent for three offenses, none
of which offenses were committed in the same behavioral incident,
which offenses were committed within the preceding 24 months and
which offenses would be felonies if committed by an adult, and is alleged by delinquency petition to have committed any felony other than
those described in clauses (2), (3) or (4).94
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. MINN. STAT. § 260.125(3) (1980) (emphasis added). The "aggravated
felonies against the person," id. at § 260.125(3) (1), were defined to include violations of a number of provisions of the criminal code: MiNN. STAT. § 609.135
(1978) (murder in the first degree); id. at § 609.19 (murder in the second degree); id. at § 609.15 (murder in the third degree); id. at § 609.20(1)-(2) (manslaughter); id. at § 609.45 (aggravated robbery-armed); id. at §§ 609.342, -.343, .344(c) (d), -.345(c) (d) (criminal sexual conduct); id. at § 609.561 (arson in the
first degree); id. at § 609.58(2) (b) (burglary of a residence while armed); id. at
609.713 (terroristic threats); id. at §§ 609.221, .222, .223, .245 (Supp. 1979) (aggravated assaults).
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In response to Dahl, the legislature adopted a modified version of a matrix 95 that establishes a prima facie case for certification under the amenability and dangerousness provisions
when various combinations of a youth's present offense and/or
prior record are present.96 Under the new statute, the prosecution can establish a prima facie case of both nonamenability
and dangerousness simply by proving that the juvenile is at
least sixteen years of age, that the present crime charged is a
serious offense, and that the combination of the present crime
charged and the prior record brings the case within one of the
subdivisons' clauses. 97 The statute is intended to overrule the
Minnesota Supreme Court's position, earlier enunciated in
Dahl, that "age and seriousness of the crime" alone are insufficient conditions for certification and that there must be "direct
evidence that the juvenile endangers the public safety" before
he or she can be certified. 98
Although the effective date of the legislation was August 1,
1980, a juvenile's offenses committed prior to that date are also
considered as part of the prior juvenile offense history.99 In addition, the new legislation requires the juvenile court that
95. See Feld, supra note 1, at 573-78, 617-18.
96. The legislative matrix incorporated in this subdivision establishes a
prima facie case of both nonamenability and dangerousness by proving that a
youth is 16 and:
Present Crime Charged

Prior Juvenile Offense History

(1)

Aggravated Felony:
a) cruel or b) sophisticated

No prior record

(2)

Murder 1st Degree

No prior record

(3)

Murder 2nd or 3rd degree. Manslaughter 1st degree. Criminal Sexual Conduct 1st degree. Assault 1st degree.

One (1) prior felony adjudication within previous 24
months

(4)

Manslaugher 2nd degree. Kidnapping.
Criminal sexual conduct 2nd degree.
Arson 1st degree. Aggravated robbery.
Assault 2nd degree.

Two (2) prior felony adjudications within previous 24
months

(5)

Any felony not subsumed in the foregoing provisions

Three (3) prior felony adjudications within previous 24
months

MiNN. STAT.

§ 260.125(3) (1980).

97. See id.
98. 278 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Minn. 1979). See notes 78-86 supra and accompanying text.
99. "[S]ections are effective August 1, 1980 and apply to offenses committed on or after that date except with respect to the history of offenses provided
for in [§ 260.125(31)]." Juveniles and Corrections Act, § 23, 1980 Minn. Sess.
Law Serv. (West 1980).
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grants or denies a motion for reference for adult prosecution toissue an order in writing that contains 'findings of fact and conclusions of law" which support the decision, but this requirement is in keeping with prior judicial opinions mandating
findings and conclusions to facilitate appellate review.10 0
The legislature further changed the manner in which hearings are conducted in juvenile courts. Although juvenile court
hearings "shall be without a jury and may be conducted in an
informal manner,"' 0 1 the rules of evidence are now applicable
both to juvenile adjudicatory hearings and to certification proceedings. 0 2 The types of evidence typically relied upon in certification proceedings may be restricted or at least more
difficult to introduce under this new limitation. Although
youths in certification proceedings previously enjoyed the right
to counsel, the legislature has now provided that the right en03
tails "effective assistance of counsel."'
The legislature also added a new provision that grants juve04
nile courts the power to levy fines of up to $500 for offenses.
This provision may change the population of youths for whom
certification is ultimately sought. To the extent that certification was previously used in rural counties to impose the
"adult" disposition of a fine,105 this new power for juvenile
courts may obviate the resort to a waiver subterfuge.
The final action with direct implications for certification is
the legislature's adoption of determinate, presumptive sentencing guidelines.106 The sentencing guidelines, which are only
applicable to adult offenders, provide that both the disposition
of an offender-whether or not to imprison-and the length of
the sentence are to be based on a combination of the seriousness of the present offense and the offender's prior criminal
record. In calculating an adult offender's prior criminal record,
the sentencing guidelines mandate that the offender's juvenile
offense history must be partially considered.107 Moreover,
juveniles transferred for prosecution as adults will be sen100. See MINN. STAT. § 260.125(5) (1980); note 90 supra.
101. MINN.STAT. § 260.155(1) (1980)..
102. Section 260.155(1) now provides that "[t]he rules of evidence... and
the laws of evidence shall apply in ... hearings conducted pursuant to section
260.125 [certification]."
103. MIN. STAT. § 260.155(2) (1980) (emphasis added).
104. See id. at § 260.185(1)(f).
105. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
106. See MmN. STAT. § 244.09 (1980); see generally 1980 SENTENCING GUIDE-

LUiEs, supra note 41.
107. 1980 SENTENCING GumE/uNEs, supra note 41, at 5, 7-8, 22-24.
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tenced under the same presumptive guidelines affecting offenders over the age of eighteen. 0 8 Thus, the presumptive
sentencing guidelines affect both juvenile justice administration and certification by including juvenile convictions within
an adult's offense history and by sentencing certified juveniles
in the same way as other adults.
For a juvenile court to administer the new prima facie certification matrix, and for an adult criminal court to compute a
juvenile's prior record within an adult offense history for sentencing, both must have access to juvenile court records. Because juvenile court records and proceedings have traditionally
been kept confidential, the legislature mandated that juvenile
court judges keep records of delinquent adjudications until offenders reach the age of twenty-three years, release the records
of an individual to a requesting adult court for purposes of sentencing, and provide copies of the records concerning a particular child to any other requesting juvenile court.109
V. THE MEANING OF THE JUVENILE CODE REVISIONS:
THE RATIONALE AND CONSEQUENCES OF
REFORM
This section of the Article identifies some of the remaining
deficiencies, examines the resulting newly created problems,
and explores possible rationales and consequences of the recent amendments to Minnesota's juvenile code. Because the
amendments have effectively eliminated most of the distinctions between the adult and juvenile court systems, new
problems will now be encountered.
A.

CHANGE IN THE PURPOSE CLAUSE-WHEN IS A JUVENILE
COURT NO LONGER A JUVENILE COURT?

The change in the juvenile code's purpose clause embodies
a fundamental, philosophical shift in the treatment of juvenile
offenders.11 0 Historically, juvenile courts were viewed as rehabilitative social service agencies functioning as surrogate parents for youngsters who had incidentally violated the law. The
amended purpose clause, with its emphasis on promoting public safety and reducing delinquency, reflects a substantial repudiation of the deterministic and immaturity assumptions of
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 36.
MiNN. STAT. § 260.161(1) (1980).
See text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
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earlier juvenile justice."' Although the juvenile court's new
purpose statement is similar to that of the criminal code, the
criminal code ironically articulates a greater commitment to
the "rehabilitative ideal" of justice than does the juvenile
code.112
A number of important philosophical, administrative, and
procedural differences between juvenile courts and adult criminal courts are premised on the different emphases placed on
treatment and punishment in the two systems. Thus, juvenile
court proceedings are conducted informally, confidentially,
without juries, and under circumstances that are foreign to
adult criminal courts.113 The Supreme Court, in McKeiver v.
4
held that fourteenth amendment due process
Pennsylvania,11
did not require states to provide jury trials in juvenile court adjudications because "fundamental fairness" required only reliable factual determinations that could be made by a judge as
readily as by a jury."15 The Court feared that jury trials would
111. See notes 2-5 supra and accompanying text.
112. The criminal code is intended "[tio protect the public safety and welfare by preventing the commission of crimes through the deterring effect of the
sentences authorized, the rehabilitation of those convicted, and their confinement when the public safety and interest requires." MINN. STAT. § 609.01(1) (1)
(1978).
113. See Feld, supra note 1, at 601-05.
114. 403 U.S. 528 (1970).
115. Id. at 543. In analyzing the McKeiver decision, one commentator noted
that
[T]he Court held that the only requirement for "fundamental fairness"
in juvenile court proceedings is "accurate factflnding" and reasoned
that this requirement could be as well satisfied by a judge as by a jury.
But in suggesting that nothing more than accurate factfinding was required to satisfy the requirements of due process in the juvenile context, the Court departed significantly from its own prior analysis of the
dual function of procedures in juvenile court adjudications, for earlier
decisions actually appear to have been premised on two rationales-accurate factfinding and protection against governmental oppression.
Feld, supra note 1, at 602-03 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). This
commentator further observed that
[t] his dual function of procedures was clearly recognized, for example, by the Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), when it
held, inter alia, that juveniles must be accorded the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination in connection with juvenile court
adjudications of delinquency. See id. at 55. If the Court in Gault had
been concerned solely with the reliability of juvenile confessions and
the accuracy of fact finding, safeguards other than the fifth amendment
privilege-for example, a requirement that all confessions be shown to
have been made voluntarily-would have sufficed. See id. at 75-78
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court, however, recognized that fifth amendment safeguards were not required
simply to ensure accurate fact finding or reliable confessions, but to
serve as a fundamental bulwark of the adversary system and a means
of maintaining a balance between the individual and the state.
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interfere with the flexibility and informality of juvenile court
proceedings. 1 16 Reluctant to "disallow the States to experiment
further and to seek in new and different ways the elusive answers to the problems of the young,"" 7 the Court expressed serious reservations about the impact of juries on juvenile court
proceedings.118
The denial of jury trials in juvenile court proceedings, however, has led to a "right to treatment" for incarcerated young
offenders."19 Following the McKeiver decision, incarceration of
a juvenile without the benefit of criminal procedural safeguards, such as a jury trial, could be justified only if the juvenile was receiving rehabilitative treatment.120 Incarceration
without appropriate treatment constitutes punishment which, if
imposed without the procedural safeguards of the criminal
121
process, violates due process.
The change in the purpose of Minnesota's juvenile courts
Feld, supra note 1, at 603 n.284.
116. "If the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little need for its separate
existence." 403 U.S. at 551.
117. Id. at 547.
118. The court in McKeiver concluded that "the jury trial, if required as a
matter of constitutional precept, will make the juvenile proceeding into a fully
adversary process and will put an effective end to what has been the idealistib
prospect of an intimate, informal, protective proceeding." 403 U.S. at 454. The
court also pointed out that "[i]f the jury trial were to be injected into the juvenile court system as a matter of right, it would bring with it into that system
the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system
and, possibly, the public trial." Id. at 550.
119. See Feld, supra note 1, at 535-40. See generally Note, Establishment of
a ConstitutionalRight to Treatmentfor Delinquent Children,26 BAYLOR L. REV.
366 (1974); Note, The Courts, The Constitution and Juvenile InstitutionalReform, 52 B.U. L. REv. 33 (1972); Note, InstitutionalizedJuvenilesHave a Right to
Rehabilitative Treatment,4 CAP. U.L. REV. 85 (1974); Note, JudicialRecognition
and Implementation of a Right to Treatmentfor InstitutionalizedJuveniles, 49
NOTRE DAME LAw., 1051 (1974); Note, A Right to Treatmentfor Juveniles?, 1973
WASH. U. L.Q. 157; Recent Development, ConstitutionalRight to Treatmentfor
Juveniles Adjudicated to Be Delinquent-Nelson v. Heyne, 12 AM. CaM. L. REV.
209 (1974); Recent Development, Limits on Punishment and Entitlement to Rehabilitative Treatment of InstitutionalizedJuveniles: Nelson v. Heyne, 60 VA.
L. REv. 864 (1974).
120. See generally Pena v. New York State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Robinson v. Leahy, 401 F. Supp. 1027 (N.D. 111.1975); Long v.
Powell, 388 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53
(E.D. Tex. 1974); Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973); Nelson v.
Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972), affd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974);
Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Inmates of Boys Training
School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972); Baker v. Hamilton, 345 F. Supp.
345 (W.D. Ky. 1972); Lollis v. New York State Dep't of Social Servs., 322 F. Supp.
473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
121. See cases cited in note 120 supra.
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conflicts with the basic premise of the McKeiver Court in denying juries to juveniles-that juvenile court systems are primarily committed to the rehabilitation of young offenders. 22
When a state's legislature departs from these rehabilitative
purposes to emphasize more punitive, traditional criminal law
purposes, has the legislature in fact repudiated the treatment
differences that distinguish the juvenile and criminal systems
and that justify both denying juveniles the right to trial by jury
and maintaining a separate system of justice for young offenders?
Other states that have amended their juvenile code purpose clauses to emphasize public safety and retribution have
been confronted with the issue of a juvenile's right to trial by
jury.123 The state of Washington, for example, undertook a farreaching revision of its juvenile code that included a purpose
clause 24 similar to Minnesota's new clause. In State v. Law122. 403 U.S. at 544 n.5.
123. Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 31-5-7-1 (Burns 1973) with hm. CODE ANN.
§ 31-6-1-1 (Burns Supp. 1979) (providing inter alia "a juvenile justice system
that protects the public by enforcing the legal obligations children have to society"); compare VA. CODE § 16.1-240 (Supp. 1975) with VA. CODE § 16.1-227
(Supp. 1979) ("protect the community against those acts of its citizens which
are harmful to others and to reduce the incidence of delinquent behavior").
124. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.010(2) (West Supp. 1980) provides:
It is the intent of the legislature that a system capable of having primary responsibility for, being accountable for, and responding to the
needs of youthful offenders, as defined by this chapter, be established.
It is the further intent of the legislature that youth, in turn, be held accountable for their offenses and that both communities and the juvenile courts carry out their functions consistent with this intent. To
effectuate these policies, it shall be the purpose of this chapter to:
(a) Protect the citizenry from criminal behavior;
(b) Provide for determining whether accused juveniles have committed offenses as defined by this chapter;
(c) Make the juvenile offender accountable for his or her criminal
behavior;
(d) 'Provide for punishment commensurate with the age, crime,
and criminal history of the juvenile offender;
(e) Provide due process for juveniles alleged to have committed an
offense;
(f) Provide necessary treatment, supervision, and custody for juvenile offenders;
(g) Provide for the handling of juvenile offenders by communities
whenever consistent with public safety;
(h) Provide for restitution to victims of crime;
(i) Develop effective standards and goals for the operation, funding, and evaluation of all components of the juvenile justice system
and related services at the state and local levels; and
(j) Provide for a clear policy to determine what types of offenders
shall receive punishment, treatment, or both, and to determine the
jurisdictional limitations of the courts, institutions and community
services.
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ley,125 a juvenile argued that the changes in the Washington juvenile code had "altered the law's focus from concern for
treatment and rehabilitation of the juvenile to imposition of
punishment according to the offense and the record of the juvenile. Therefore... the proceedings [were] in the nature of a
criminal prosecution entitling [him] to a jury trial as part of
due process."' 26 The Washington Supreme Court acknowl-

edged that emphasis on accountability for criminal behavior
and punishment based on the juvenile's present and past offenses could effectively convert juvenile court proceedings into
criminal proceedings, but found that the statutory provisions
did not treat and sentence juveniles as if they were adult offenders. The court, relying on the dubious rationale that sometimes "punishment is treatment,"' 27 held that the legislature
could permissibly conclude that "accountability for criminal behavior, the prior criminal activity, and punishment commensurate with age, crime and criminal history does as much to
rehabilitate, correct, and direct an errant youth as does the
prior philosophy of focusing upon the particular characteristics
of the individual juveniles.' 28 The court reasoned that because
the legislature authorized treatment as well as punishment of
young offenders, and because juveniles were incarcerated in facilities separate from adult penal institutions, a jury trial was
29
not mandated.1
125.
126.

91 Wash. 2d 654, 591 P.2d 772 (1979).
Id. Lawley was statutorily denied a jury trial on the basis of WASH.

REV. CODE § 13.40.021(2) (1977).

127. The court assumed beneficial consequences could flow from coercive
social control 91 Wash. 2d at 656-57, 591 P.2d at 773.
128. Id.
129. Id. A strong dissent in Lawley reasoned that because juvenile court
proceedings first adjudicated the alleged offense and then punished the offender in proportion to the offense adjudicated, a jury trial was required. The
dissent analyzed the Washington purpose clause, as had the majority, and concluded that
the legislature has made it clear that it is no longer the primary aim of
the juvenile justice system to attend to the welfare of the offending
child, but rather to render him accountable for his acts, to punish him,
and to serve society's demand for retribution. While the punishment
prescribed may well be less than that imposed upon offending adults
for the same offense, it nevertheless involves ... a loss of liberty ....
[n]o longer is the punishment geared to fit the needs of the child
Thus, the sysrather it is related to the seriousness of the offense ...
tem has been converted from one which was or ostensibly was
designed to protect and rehabilitate the child to one which is designed
to protect society. The present act focuses upon the purposes which
are generally served by adult criminal law.
Id. at 662, 591 P.2d at 775-76 (Rosellini, J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned
that while the McKeiver Court was reluctant to constitutionally impose jury trials on state juvenile proceedings that were at least nominally rehabilitative,
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The majority in Lawley failed to address the issue of
whether the similarities of or the differences between the criminal and juvenile justice systems allowed the juvenile system to
dispense with criminal procedural safeguards. Reasoning that
the solution of social problems is a legislative function, the
court simply deferred to the legislature's conclusion that punishment might be as effective as individualized treatment in the
rehabilitation of juveniles.130 There are, of course, many ways
to alter people's behavior--education, counseling, rehabilitative
treatment, economic incentives, punishment, and the like-and
the legislature is free to choose whichever strategy it desires to
modify behavior. When the legislature chooses to shape behavior through punishment, however, the procedural safeguards of
the criminal law must be observed despite any social benefits
that may result. Although the length of confinement of a juvenile may be less than that of an adult, and the place of confinement not penal, confinement still entails a loss of liberty
imposed to punish violations of the law, and determinate
sentences do not take into account a youth's "need" for such
31
restraint.1
As juvenile proceedings become increasingly formal and
"criminalized," courts are often being asked "whether so many
of the attributes of a juvenile proceeding have been discarded
32
that the proceeding is in effect 'criminal' in nature."1
Whether a juvenile's disposition is in effect treatment or punishment is not readily apparent, especially when a court, as in
Lawley, confounds both language and reason to conclude that
sometimes punishment is treatment. Other courts have been
more sensitive to this linguistic perversion and have recognized
that "[w] hen, however, the protections provided to the juvenile
criminal offender have been so eroded away that what is actually a punishment is characterized as a treatment, an abuse of
constitutional dimension has occurred, and, a jury trial is required before punishment, although appropriate, may be in33
flicted."1
Some analytical tools are available to aid courts in deteronce the Washington Legislature reshaped the purpose of the juvenile system,
the judiciary had to recognize that jury trials are an essential element in a system of justice which punishes offenders. Id. (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 657, 591 P.2d at 773.
131. Juvenile offenders in Washington receive determinate sentences proportional to their age, the seriousness of their offense, and their prior criminal
history. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.030 (West 1977).
132. In re Felder, 93 Misc. 2d 369, 370, 402 N.Y.S.2d 528, 529 (1978).
133. Id. at 372, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
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mining whether the purpose of a juvenile's disposition is punishment or treatment. Dispositions based on considerations of
the offense-retribution or deterrence-are characteristically
determinate and proportional; those based on considerations of
the offender-rehabilitation or incapacitation-are typically indeterminate.134 Applying this simple test to the juvenile sentencing provisions in Washington reveals that the Lawley court
erred in denying the juvenile a jury trial because juvenile dispositions in Washington are determinate and proportioned according to the seriousness of the present offense and prior
35
criminal history.
The Minnesota Legislature's enactment of a new juvenile
code purpose clause raises a serious issue of whether juveniles
in Minnesota are entitled to trial by jury in juvenile court proceedings. The new language of the purpose clause is functionally indistinguishable from the language in the criminal code's
purpose clause;136 while some procedural differences remain
between the two systems, the systems are increasingly similar.
An analysis of other changes in juvenile court legislation and
administration will aid in determining whether juvenile proceedings are sufficiently akin to criminal proceedings that a
jury is now constitutionally required.

B. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF CERTIFICATION
1.

Probable Cause Hearings

Minnesota's certification legislation resolves several procedural issues previously raised by waivers of juvenile court jurisdiction. Prior to any transfer decision, a probable cause
hearing is now required to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that the youth committed the offense(s) alleged in the petition.137 Waiver statutes in other
jurisdictions often require similar probable cause hearings.138
134. "The distinction between indeterminate and determinate sentencing is
not semantic, but indicates fundamentally different public policies. Indeterminate sentencing is based upon notions of rehabilitation, while determinate sentencing is based upon a desire for retribution or punishment." Id. at 374, 402
N.Y.S.2d at 533. See generally N. Moius, supra note 10; H. PACKER, supra note
10; A. VON HIRScH, supra note 43; H.M. Hart, supra note 10; see also Symposium-Sentencing,7 HoFsTRA L. REV. 1-139, 243-470 (1978).
135. See note 131 supra.
136. See notes 89 & 112 supra and accompanying text.
137. MiNN. STAT. § 260.125(2) (d) (1) (1980).
138. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 3104(4) (1978). In the absence of probable cause hearing provisions, certified youths have challenged the constitutionality of transfer. The issue was somewhat clouded by Breed v. Jones, 421
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Although Minnesota now requires a probable cause hearing in waiver proceedings, the nature of the hearing is unclear.
The amended statute simply requires that the court find that
"there is probable cause, as defined by the rules of criminal
procedure."' 3 9 Whether the probable cause determination is to
be an adversarial one akin to a preliminary hearing, or a determination based on a written record, is ambiguous. 140 Under the
rules of criminal procedure,141 admissible evidence in probable
cause determinations includes hearsay, written statements of
witnesses, and summaries by policy officers of their own or
other officers' investigations. 4 2
The Minnesota Supreme Court clarified the probable cause
showing required by the rules of criminal procedure in State v.
43
The court found that the rules supplanted the statFlorence.1
utorily-required adversarial preliminary hearing, and held that
a determination of probable cause could be "based upon the
entire record including reliable -hearsay in whole or in part."14 4
U.S. 519 (1975), when the Supreme Court held that jeopardy attached to juvenile court adjudications and prohibited subsequent adult criminal prosecution
for the same offense. Id. at 531. Thus, Breed requires a state to decide in which
system-juvenile or adult-it will proceed against an offender before there is
an adjudication on the merits. The court in Breed left unresolved whether a
probable cause hearing was constitutionally requiredin the juvenile court as a
condition precedent to transfer; the Court did note that "nothing decided today
forecloses States from requiring, as a prerequisite to the transfer of a juvenile,
substantial evidence that he committed the offense charged, so long as the
showing required is not made in an adjudicatory proceeding." Id. at 538 n.18.
In State v. Duncan, 250 N.W.2d 189 (Minn. 1977), the Minnesota Supreme
Court considered the question of whether a probable cause hearing was a constitutional prerequisite of adult waiver. The court, noting that "Breed declined
to express any opinion as to whether an evidentiary hearing with respect to the
commission of the offense was a necessary component of a transfer hearing,"
surveyed the procedural practices in other jurisdictions in which state legislatures had not required probable cause hearings and concluded that "a probable
cause hearing at the time of referral is not constitutionally required." 250
N.W.2d at 196-97. The court observed, however, that a probable cause hearing
would be a salutary addition to waiver proceedings. Id.
139. MmN. STAT. § 260.125(2) (d) (1) (1980).
140. See generally H. McCARR, 8 MINN. PRACTICE Cnm. LAw & PRoc. § 685
(1976).
141. Mum. R. CRnm. P. 11.03 provides:
The court shall hear and determine all motions made by the defendant
or prosecution, including a motion that there is an insufficient showing
of probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense
charged in the complaint, and receive such evidence as may be offered
in support or opposition. Each party may cross-examine any witnesses
produced by the other. A finding by the court of probable cause shall
be based upon the entire record including reliable hearsay in whole or
in part.
142. M-NN. R Cim. P. 18.06(1).
143. 306 Minn. 442, 239 N.W.2d 892 (1976).
144. Id. at 452, 239 N.W.2d at 899.
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The court concluded that "[i] n most instances, the information
available to the judge presiding at an omnibus hearing will
form an adequate basis for determining probable cause, thus
making unnecessary the production and cross-examination of
witnesses in court." 4 5 In authorizing nonadversarial probable
cause procedures, the Florence court relied on Gerstein v.
Pugh, 4 6 in which the Supreme Court upheld ex parte judicial
determinations of probable cause. 47 The Florence court noted
that
[a] carefully drawn and sufficiently detailed complaint made by an investigating officer and incorporating reliable hearsay could in some
limited situations be adequate support for a finding of probable cause,
at least where the essential truth of the facts averred in the complaint
is not contested. In the more usual situation, the complaint will and
should be buttressed by the police report, including verified statements
of witnesses whose observations form the basis of the complaint and,
in addition, the results of disclosure and discovery procedures required

by the rules.14 8

The net result of the Florence decision is that, in the vast
majority of criminal cases, probable cause is based upon the
complaint supported by police reports, statements by witnesses, the omnibus hearing, and the products of discovery. An
adversarial probable cause determination occurs only in those
relatively rare instances when the defendant produces witnesses whose testimony, if believed, would exonerate him or
her. It is significant to note, however, that juvenile court proceedings provide for neither a pre-adjudicative omnibus hearing at which probable cause would be established nor a
carefully drawn and sufficiently detailed allegation of probable
cause in a juvenile court petition. 49 Thus, the formal provision
of probable cause determinations in waiver hearings may only
entail a review of a documentary record, despite the additional,
and significantly greater, screening safeguards afforded
adults.150
2.

Burden of Proof
The Minnesota Legislature also codified the burden of

145. Id. at 453, 239 N.W.2d at 900.
146. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
147. Id. at 119-25.
148. 307 Minn. at 457, 239 N.W.2d at 902.
149. See In re Hitzemann, 281 Minn. 275, 279-80, 161 N.W.2d 542, 545 (1968)
(authorizing conclusory factual allegations in a delinquency petition).
150. The Supreme Court has refrained from flatly holding "that all rights
constitutionally assured for the adult accused are to be imposed upon the state
juvenile proceeding." McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
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proof in juvenile transfer proceedings, requiring the prosecuting authority to demonstrate "by clear and convincing evidence
that the child is not suitable to treatment or that the public
safety is not served."' 5 ' The Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules
52
require this same standard of proof.1
The legislature adopted the "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof over the less stringent "preponderance of the evidence" standard. 5 3 The preference of one
standard over the other is a function of the underlying policies
of allocating burdens of proof and the dangers of erroneous factual determinations.154 As noted by McCormick, while "the
traditional measure of persuasion in civil cases is by a preponderance of evidence, there is a limited range of claims and contentions in which the party is required to establish by a more
exacting measure of persuasion."155 Typically, this more exacting civil burden of proof is required when "the particular type
of claim should be disfavored on policy grounds."156 The legislature apparently concluded that waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction should be subjected to the more exacting burden of
proof because the policies underlying the juvenile court system
as a separate entity dictate that "'juveniles should, in the ordinary case, be subject to juvenile court jurisdiction. Transfer,
therefore, should be the exception and not the rule.' "115
The burden of proof is ultimately a verbal formula used to
describe the degree to which the fact finder must be persuaded.
The wisdom of the legislature's decision in assigning a requisite degree of persuasion to a particular claim depends upon
the substantive decision the fact finder must make. In its revision of the juvenile code, the Minnesota Legislature has not addressed the fundamental transfer issue-whether it is possible
151. MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2) (d) (2) (1980).
152. MINN. JUV. CT. R. 8-7(2) (MINN. STAT. § 480.0595 (1980) directs the state
supreme court to promulgate new juvenile court rules).
153. See C. McCoRMIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 339, 340 (2d
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]. Jurisdictions have split over the
issue of the amount of proof required. See, e.g., In re F.S., 586 P.2d 607, 611-12
(Alaska 1978) ("preponderance of the evidence," construing ALAsKA STAT.
§ 47.10.060).
154. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970); J. WiGMORE, EviDENCE § 2498 (3d ed. 1940 & Supp. 1977) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
155. McCORMICK, supra note 153, at 796.
156. Id. at 798. Accord, WIGMORE, supra note 154, at 325-35.
157. State v. Bannister, 250 S.E.2d 53, 56 (W. Va. 1978) (quoting Smith v.
Scott, 238 S.E.2d 223, 226 (W. Va. 1977)). Even jurisdictions employing a "preponderance of the evidence" standard emphasize that "the burden of persuasion on the state is not light." See, e.g., In re F.S., 586 P.2d 607, 611 (Alaska

1978).
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to determine a youth's amenability to treatment or dangerousness with any degree of certainty or reliability. If amenability
and dangerousness cannot be determined with any degree of
precision on the basis of clinical indicators, then the legislature's use of the more exacting "clear and convincing evidence"
standard of proof will compound the difficulties inherent in
making those determinations. The significance of imposing on
the prosecution a more stringent burden of proof must also be
considered in light of the burden of persuasion when establishing a prima facie case.
C.

A

PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR WAIVER BASED ON PROOF OF AGE
AND CERTAIN OFFENSES-DID THE LEGISLATURE
OVERRULE IN RE DAHL?

One of the more significant aspects of the Minnesota Juvenile Code revision is the adoption of Minnesota Statutes section 260.125 subd. 3 (1980), which -provides that if the
prosecution proves that the youth is sixteen years of age or
older and is charged with certain types of offenses or possesses
a certain prior record, a prima facie case that the public safety
is threatened or that the youth is not amenable to treatment is
established.158 Previously, only evidence that directly proved
or supported an inference of nonamenability or dangerousness
could result in a youth's certification.159 Thus, while still retaining the "nonamenability" or "dangerousness" criteria, the
legislature has provided the prosecutor with an additional way
to prove those facts besides by direct evidence.
1.

The Meaning of PrimaFacie Case

The revised statute gives rise to two critical issues: what is
the meaning of prima facie case as used in the statute and what
effect does proving a prima facie case have upon the allocation
of the burdens of production and persuasion in certification
hearings. The first problem, defining prima facie case, is compounded because the term "is often used in two senses and is
therefore an ambiguous and often misleading term."1 60 As described by Wigmore, the term prima facie may mean either
that: a) the evidence presented is sufficient to get the case to
the finder of fact (i.e., to withstand a motion for a directed verdict by the opposing party); or b) the evidence is sufficient to
158.
159.
160.

MumN. STAT. § 260.125(3) (1980). See text accompanying note 94 supra.
See In re Dahl, 278 N.W.2d 316, 321 (Minn. 1979).
McCoRMIcK, supra note 153, at 803 n.26.
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shift the burden of production to the party against whom the
prima facie case is established (i.e., a form of rebuttable presumption) .161
The second issue, the effect that proving a prima facie case
has on the ultimate burdens of production and persuasion in
certification proceedings, poses problems of statutory construction. If the prosecution establishes its prima facie case by proving only the various offenses described in section 260.125(3)
and rests, and if the defendant introduces no rebuttal evidence
and rests, may a juvenile court judge waive jurisdiction under
the new statute based solely on that showing? Must a juvenile
court judge waive jurisdiction on that showing alone? If the
prosecution establishes its prima facie case and the defense
also submits evidence in response, then what is the effect of
the prima facie case language on the court's decision? These
problems of statutory construction are aggravated by the conflicting use of permissive language in the statute's second subdivision---"the juvenile court may order a reference.. ."--and
the nondiscretionary language in the third subdivision--"a
prima facie case ... shall have been established."162
In recognizing the possible alternative meanings of prima
facie case 163 in civil cases, 6 4 the Minnesota Supreme Court
161. The term 'primafacieevidence' or rimafacie case'is used in two
senses, and it is often difficult to detect which of these is intended in
the judicial passage in handrimafacie'is sometimes
(I) (1) In discussing presumptions, the term
used as equivalent to the notion of a presumption, even in the strict
sense of a ruling of the judge putting upon the opponent the duty of
producing evidence....
(2) But the phrase 'primafacie'is also, and clearly enough, found used
in a very different sense ... namely, where the proponent having the
first duty of producing some evidence in order to pass the judge to the
jury, has fulfilled that duty, satisfied the judge, and may properly claim
that the jury be allowed to consider his case. This sufficiency of the evidence to go to the jury... is also referred to as a 'primafacie' case.
WIGMORE, supra note 154, at 293-94 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
162. Compare MiNN. STAT. § 260.125(2) (1980) (emphasis added) udth id. at
§ 260.125(3) (emphasis added).
163. See, e.g., Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Fitzimons, 261 N.W.2d 586, 590 n.10
(Minn. 1977) (while prima facie case may shift the burden of proof "in the
sense of going forward with evidence, to the opposing party" it can also be used
in the sense of "creat[ing] a question for the factfinder").
164. The use of a prima facie case to create presumptions in criminal cases
is beyond the scope of this analysis because the issue in a certification proceeding is dispositional, not adjudicative, and thus governed by issues of civil and
not criminal procedure. See generally Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); In re
T.D.S., 289 N.W.2d 137 (Minn. 1980).
Suffice it to say, the issue of presumptions in the context of criminal prosecutions is greatly complicated by the requirement that the prosecution prove
every material element beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally Mullaney v.
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tends to treat a prima facie case as a rebuttable presumption
that shifts the burden of producing substantial, controverting
evidence to the party opposing the prima facie case. 165 Once a
party has established its prima facie case, the burden of producing evidence is shifted to the opposing party to rebut the
presumptive facts. 166 Thus, the factual presumption created by
a prima facie case stands unless and until rebutted by placing
contrary evidence on the record. If substantial, countervailing
evidence is presented, then the matter is to be determined by
the trier of fact on the basis of the entire record and not by reference to the prima facie case. 167 In civil cases, if the party
against whom a prima facie case is established does not introduce rebuttal evidence, the proponent is entitled to prevail on
that issue. 16 8 Functionally, then, the procedural operation of a
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The problem of
permissible presumptions in criminal cases and the necessary connections between facts proved and other facts that may be presumed or inferred has confronted the courts on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Turner v. United States,
396 U.S. 398, 418-19 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 32-36 (1969); Tot v.
United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467-72 (1943). The Minnesota Supreme Court has
also grappled with the issue of the legislature's power to create presumptions
in criminal cases. See, e.g., State v. Dille, 258 N.W.2d 565, 568-69 n.2 (1977); State
v. Reps, 302 Minn. 38, 51-52, 223 N.W.2d 780, 789 (1974); State v. Edwards, 269
Minn. 343, 345-48, 130 N.W.2d 623, 625-26 (1964); State v. Kelly, 218 Minn. 247, 25357, 15 N.W.2d 554, 558-60 (1944). See generally Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165 (1969); Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions,and
Burden of Proofin the CriminalLaw, 88 YALE L.J. 1325 (1979); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 22 STAN. L. REV. 341
(1970).
165. See Fire Marshall v. Sherman, 201 Minn. 594, 596, 277 N.W. 249, 250
(1938) ("prima facie case which the statute purports to create, simply means
that the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts"). Accord, Holton v.
Parker, 302 Minn. 167, 175-77, 224 N.W.2d 139, 145 (1974); Olson v. Duluth M. &
I.R. Ry., 213 Minn. 106, 113, 5 N.W.2d 492, 496 (1942); Hudson-Duluth Furriers,
Inc. v. McCullough, 182 Minn. 581, 584-85, 235 N.W. 537, 539 (1931).
166. In the absence of evidence invalidating a prima facie case, the party
who establishes it is entitled to a directed verdict on the issue. See generally
Riley v. Lake, 295 Minn. 43, 203 N.W.2d 331 (1972); Minneapolis Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 237 Minn. 111, 53 N.W.2d 828 (1952); Lee v.
Molter, 227 Minn. 557, 35 N.W.2d 801 (1949); Flitton v. Daleki, 216 Minn. 549, 13
N.W.2d 477 (1944); Wojtowicz v. Belden, 221 Minn. 461, 1 N.W.2d 409 (1942);
Topinka v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 189 Minn. 75, 248 N.W. 660 (1933).
167. See generally Blumberg v. Palm, 238 Minn. 259, 56 N.W.2d 412 (1953);
Flitton v. Daleki, 216 Minn. 549, 13 N.W.2d 477 (1944); Olson v. Duluth M. & LR.
Ry., 213 Minn. 106, 5 N.W.2d 492 (1942); Wojtowicz v. Belden, 211 Minn. 461, 1
N.W.2d 409 (1942); Topinka v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 189 Minn. 75, 248
N.W. 660 (1933). Hudson-Duluth Furriers, Inc. v. McCullough, 182 Minn. 581, 235
N.W. 537 (1931).
168. The party establishing a prima facie case prevails in the absence of evidence invalidating it. See notes 165-66 supra. See also Fidelity Bank & Trust
Co. v. Fitzimons, 261 N.W.2d 586, 590-91 (Minn. 1977); Elk River Concrete Prods.
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prima facie case is equivalent to a presumption in civil actions
69
under the Minnesota Rules of Evidence.1
Does the new legislation, allowing the prosecutor to establish a prima facie case of a youth's nonamenability to treatment
or dangerousness, overrule Dahl? The burden of proof and risk
of nonpersuasion remain on the prosecution to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that a youth meets the statutory
grounds for waiver of nonamenability or dangerousness. The
prosecution can meet this burden either by direct proof under
subdivision two or by indirect proof establishing the prima facie case for waiver under subdivision three of the statute.
Two examples illustrate the problems posed by these provisions. First, assume, as in Dahl, that the prosecution proves
that the youth was seventeen at the time the alleged offense
was committed, and that he is charged with murder in the first
degree.170 Without introducing any psychological data or psychiatric testimony, the prosecution then rests its prima facie
case. Suppose, contrary to the facts of Dahl, that the defendant
introduces no evidence in response to the prosecution's prima
facie case, and also rests. It would appear that the juvenile
court must certify the youth since "[a] prima facie case simply
means one that prevails in the absence of evidence invalidating
it" and when "the prima facie case is unopposed by evidence, a
verdict must be directed accordingly."171
Even in the "easy case"-a prima facie case with no rebuttal evidence-however, is it clear that certification is mandated?
The legislature did not entirely erase the discretion of the juveCo. v. American Casualty Co., 268 Minn. 284, 291-92, 129 N.W.2d 309, 314-15
(1964).
169. Proving a prima facie case, and thereby creating a legal presumption
that shifts to the opposing party an obligation to respond, has the same effect
as Mm. R. Evmn. § 301, which provides that
a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of
the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the
party on whom it was originally cast.
The procedural operation of presumptions requires the opponent to introduce
evidence to rebut the assumed fact. Once the presumption is rebutted, it has
no further evidentiary function, although the underlying evidence giving rise to
or rebutting the fact may still be probative of the ultimate issues being determined. See generally Thompson, Presumptions and the New Rules of Evidence
in Minnesota, 2 WM. MrrcHE.L L. REV. 167 (1976).
170. See In re Dahl, 278 N.W.2d 316, 317 (Minn. 1979); text accompanying
notes 65-86 supra.
171. Wojtowicz v. Belden, 211 Minn. 461, 465, 1 N.W.2d 409, 410-11 (1942). See
generally Riley v. Lake, 295 Minn. 43, 203 N.W.2d 331 (1972); Flitton v. Dalecki,
216 Minn. 549, 13 N.W.2d 477 (1944).
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nile court as the statute still provides that "the juvenile court
may order reference only if... the prosecuting authority has
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence" that the youth
is dangerous or not amenable to treatment.172 Certification
under this statutory language has never been mandatory and
the Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently emphasized
that reference is merely discretionary and permissive. 7 3 When
the statute's permissive language "may order a reference" is
read in conjunction with the phrase "only if," and the burden of
establishing the grounds for waiver is by "clear and convincing" evidence,174 it appears that reference is still only to be ordered in exceptional circumstances. While there is thus an
argument that even an unrebutted prima facie case may be insufficient to require reference, the legislature's intent to overrule Dahl and the shifting of the burden of production should
result in a waiver in this situation.
On the other hand, suppose that in the "easy case"--a
prima facie case with no rebuttal evidence-the juvenile court
does certify the youth for adult prosecution and in its written
findings and conclusions opines simply that the youth is seventeen years old and charged with first degree murder. The
75
state's "prima facie case . . .shall have been established"
presumably by clear and convincing evidence. Can the Minnesota Supreme Court now reverse such a certification? Perhaps,
but only by the rather convoluted reasoning that the prima facie case alternative in subdivision three modifies the general
permissive waiver provision of subdivision two, and that under
the latter provision a judgment of nonamenability and dangerousness requires proof of more than age and present offense. It
172. MINN.STAT. § 260.125(2) (d) (2) (1980) (emphasis added).
173. Section 260.125 has been repeatedly interpreted as permissive. See In
re F.C.R., 276 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Minn. 1979) ("juvenile court need not waive jurisdiction even where a serious crime is involved"); see also In re K.P.H., 289
N.W.2d 722, 724-25 (Minn. 1980); State v. Duncan, 312 Minn. 17, 24-26, 250 N.W.2d
189, 194 (1977); State v. Hogan, 297 Minn. 430, 438-39, 212 N.W.2d 664, 669-70
(1973). In In re J.R.M., 263 N.W.2d 74 (Minn. 1978) (per curiam), the court reemphasized the permissive and discretionary nature of reference as it corrected a misinterpretation of Duncan. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated
that
...
the juvenile court is vested with broad discretion in determining
whether either of the statutory criteria exists upon which to base its
reference decision. Although the nature of the offense is certainly a
factor to be considered in this determination and may serve as a basis
for statutory reference . . .this court has not held that reference is
mandatory when a serious crime is involved.
Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
174. See MAiN. STAT. § 260.125(2) (d) (2) (1980).
175. Id. at § 260.125(3).
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is much more likely that the waiver would be upheld since the
legislation was intended to restrict the supreme court's ability
to control juvenile court certification decisions through appellate review. Thus, giving appropriate deference to the legislature's intent to certify youths like Dahl and more serious
offenders in general, waivers should probably be compelled and
upheld on the basis of an unrebutted prima facie case.
In the second example, assume, as in Dahl, that the prosecution simply proved its prima facie case and then the defendant introduced substantial rebuttal testimony.176 The state's
proof of a prima facie case shifted the burden of producing rebuttal evidence to the defendant. Under the "bursting bubble"
view of presumptions, once the defendant has introduced substantial rebuttal testimony, the evidentiary significance of the
presumption vanishes and the ultimate question is submitted
to the trier of fact for resolution on the basis of the entire record without regard to any initial presumptions and with the
77
burden of persuasion remaining on the prosecution.1
In this "difficult case"-a prima facie prosecution case with
extensive defendant rebuttal evidence-may the juvenile court
certify the youth based solely on the youth's age and present
offense? While a prima facie case for waiver was established
under subdivision three 7 8 when the prosecution initially
proved the youth's age and offense, the case was presumably
rebutted by the defendant's proof. Thus, at least where the defendant has introduced substantial evidence of his amenability
to treatment and nondangerousness179 and has rebutted the
prima facie case, the case should be decided under the discretionary waiver provision of subdivision two rather than under
subdivision three. If the waiver decision is made under subdivision two, proof of age and present offense alone may not
carry the state's burden of persuasion because the Minnesota
Supreme Court would probably summarily reverse, citing Dahl.
176. Dahl clearly established that he was "not the typical delinquent seen
by the Juvenile Court." In re Dahl, 278 N.W.2d 316, 317-18 (Minn. 1979). See
text accompanying notes 65-86 supra.
177. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 169, at 169 (substantial evidence rebutting the presumed fact destroys the presumption and the presumption has no
further function). The "bursting bubble" has been described, most dramatically, in McCoRmciC, supra note 153, at 821.
178. See MINN. STAT. § 260.125(3) (1980).
179. Since the statute creates a prima facie case for reference on either
grounds of nonamenability or dangerousness, it is necessary for the defendant
to present evidence invalidating both grounds. See generally State v. Wolkoff,
250 Minn. 504, 85 N.W.2d 401 (1957).
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It is unlikely that the Minnesota Supreme Court will soon
be confronted with either of these hypothetical cases; thus, the
statutory prima facie case for waiver, established by proof of
age and prior offenses, will be illusory. The court has implied, 180 and the legislature has mandated, 181 that juveniles in
reference hearings should receive effective assistance of counsel. In light of the substantial likelihood of defense rebuttal
testimony, a case decided solely on proof of age and prior offenses will be rare. Rather, the prosecution will be encouraged
to prove a youth's prior record and present offense both initially to establish the prima facie case and later to sustain the
burden of persuasion on the ultimate questions of nonamenability or dangerousness. But the prosecution has been
urged to introduce evidence of prior record and present offense
since State v. Hogan.182 Moreover, the prosecution has been
prompted by the In re S.R.J. decision183 to introduce whatever
180. The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that "[t]o effectively discharge his role as an advocate in a reference proceeding, a juvenile's attorney
should search for a plan which may persuade the court that the welfare of the
child and the public safety can be served without reference." In re T.D.S., 289
N.W.2d 137, 141 (Minn. 1980).
181. MuN. STAT. § 260.155(2) (1980). See also notes 222-54 infra and accompanying text (analyzing effective assistance of counsel in reference and sentencing proceedings).
182. See text accompanying notes 76-86 supra.
183. In re S.R.J., 293 N.W.2d 32 (Minn. 1980), raised the issue of how psychiatric evaluations and testimony can be secured and used in juvenile reference
hearings. The court held that Mnm. STAT. § 260.151(1) (1978), permits the court
to order a psychiatric evaluation of the juvenile in order to assist the court in
making its discretionary judgment about the youth's disposition:
If psychiatric or psychological evaluations are to be made, the report
should go to the court with copies made available to the state and the
minor or his counsel. At the time of appointment, either the state or
the minor may suggest names of doctors to the judge. However, the
doctor so appointed shall be regarded as a court witness. The court or
either party may call and cross-examine the doctor regarding the basis
for any conclusions and recommendations made to the court. The juvenile court may, in its discretion order additional examinations.... We
perceive no constitutionalimpairment in such a procedure. Any matters disclosed by the juvenile to the doctor in the course of the examination may not be evidence or the source of evidence in any
subsequent adjudicatory procedure against the accused.
In re S.R.J., 293 N.W. at 36 (emphasis added). The court's failure to perceive
any constitutional impairments when compelling psychiatric evaluations is revealing. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), extended the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination to juvenile court proceedings. Id. at 47-55. The Minnesota Supreme Court had earlier held in State v. Olson, 274 Minn. 225, 143
N.W.2d 69 (1966), that under the state and federal constitutions, the state lacked the power to compel psychiatric evaluations of a defendant in a criminal
proceeding who raised the issue of insanity. Id. at 231, 143 N.W.2d at 74. The
court found it necessary to adopt Mum. R. CPam. P. 20.02(1), which provides for
a bifurcated hearing on the issue of insanity in order to authorize compulsory
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social, psychological, or psychiatric evidence it has available to
bolster its case. Similarly, defense attorneys, obligated to effectively assist their juvenile clients, are likely to introduce substantial evidence of their clients' redeeming social value.
Following this morass of evidence, juvenile court judges will
continue to decide on a discretionary basis if a youth is amenable to treatment or not dangerous despite the absence of
clinical tests or objective, validated indicators that accurately
predict such traits.
In the final analysis, the problem lies not with the operative significance of the prima facie case language on the burden
of proof, but with asking judges questions that they are unequipped to answer and then attempting to control judicial discretion when the judges' answers go awry. This is the problem
that resurfaced in Dahl, which the legislature not only failed to
address, but has now compounded.
2.

A Rebuttable Presumptionversus the Burden of
Persuasion-TheCaliforniaAlternative

The decision to create a rebuttable presumption for certification based on age and offense was one of several alternative
procedural strategies available to the Minnesota Legislature.
Indeed, depending on the policies the legislature intended to
advance and the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of
the prima facie case language, this strategy may be the least
satisfactory resolution of the problem. If the goals of the legislature -were to certify more youths generally, to certify youths
with significant criminal histories more quickly and consistently, to constrain judicial discretion, to achieve equality
throughout the state in the administration of waiver proceedings, and to increase the severity of punishment imposed on
juveniles committing serious felonies, then at least two other
legislative alternatives were preferable.
The legislature could have redefined juvenile court jurisdiction to exclude from juvenile courts youths with certain combinations of present offense and prior record. 184 Such a
legislative waiver results in "automatic" certification of certain
mental examinations of the defendant. Unless the court bars introduction of
compelled psychiatric testimony in all subsequent proceedings, the authority
granted in S.R.J. runs afoul of the court's fifth amendment analysis in Olson.
184. Such a redefinition is often termed a legislative waiver. See notes 54-64
supra and accompanying text. Legislative redefinition of juvenile court jurisdiction is the mechanism advocated by the author. See Feld, supra note 1, at
573-78, 617-18.
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youths to adult criminal court; this option is nondiscretionarythere is simply no occasion for a judicial waiver hearing. The
virtues of legislative waiver include objectivity, consistency,
economy, and ease of administration.
A second alternative would have been to shift the burdens
of proof and persuasion to the juvenile. Rather than shifting
the burden of proof, the legislature instead created a rebuttable
presumption, the effect of which is simply to control the burden
of production. Given the inherent uncertainties of a waiver
proceeding, however, the creation of a rebuttable presumption
may not effectively advance the legislature's underlying policies. One commentator, noting the significance of shifting
these burdens, has stated that
the policy which gives rise to the presumption could justify placing the
burden of persuasion on the opponent of the presumption. However, if
the burden of persuasion is placed upon the other party it is not because of the presumption, rather it is because the underlying policy
justifies it as a matter of substantive law. Judges and legislators must
analyze more carefully to distinguish between the effects and use of
burden of persuasion and presumptions. 185

Placing the burden of persuasion on a youth to prove amenability and nondangerousness would emphasize the policies of social defense and public safety in light of the uncertainty of the
issues being determined. In many cases, a court cannot reliably determine whether a youth is amenable or dangerous. In
these ambiguous cases the decision whether or not to waive is
determined by which party bears the burden of persuasion.
The legislative policies that justify creating a rebuttable presumption also justify placing the burden of persuasion on the
juvenile rather than on the state. Indeed, this is the way in
which California has resolved the balance of proof in certification proceedings.186
California, prior to 1976, employed judicial certification, allowing a court to waive jurisdiction if it concluded that "the minor would not be amenable to the care, treatment, and training
program available through the facilities of the juvenile
court."1 87 The substantial disparities and inconsistencies in administration of such a broad statute,188 even when interpreted
185. Thompson, supra note 169, at 179.
186. See CAJ WELF. &INST. CODE § 707(b) (West Supp. 1980). See note 191
infra.
187.

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West 1972 & Supp. 1980); 1961 Cal. Stats.

3485, ch. 161, § 2.
188. Edwards, supra note 20, at 611-12. "This wide disparity in unfitness
rates indicates that judges from county to county may be applying very different criteria in deciding whether to find a minor unfit." Id.
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in several California Supreme Court opinions,189 resulted in the
legislature's addition of statutory criteria to guide the juvenile
court in making its amenability determination.90 The following
year the waiver statute was amended to make transfer
mandatory upon the commission of certain enumerated offenses unless the youth affirmatively established his or her
amenability within the juvenile court.191 The latest amendment
placed the burden of proving amenability on the youth, rather
92
than requiring the state to prove the youth's nonamenability.1
One commentator has noted that "[t] he legislature apparently
believed that the state should not have to allege particular
egregious circumstances in order to transfer a juvenile to adult
court if the juvenile were accused of a particularly violent
93
crime."1

An obvious question arises: to what extent did shifting the
burden of proof to the juvenile affect the numbers and characteristics of young offenders being certified for adult prosecution? If, as contended, the amenability determination is an
inherently unanswerable question, then shifting the risk of uncertainty and the burden of persuasion should have substantially increased the number of juveniles waived. Indeed, there
was a substantial and dramatic increase in the number of
youths who were tried as adults after having been charged with
189. See generally People v. Browning, 45 Cal. App. 3d 125, 119 Cal. Rptr. 420
(1975); Donald L. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 592, 498 P.2d 1098, 102 Cal. Rptr.
850 (1972); People v. Smith, 5 Cal. 3d 313, 486 P.2d 1213, 96 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1971);
Jimmy H. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 3d 709, 478 P.2d 32, 91 Cal. Rptr. 600
(1970).
190. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a) (West Supp. 1980) (emphasis added)
provides:
the juvenile court may find that the minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law if it concludes that
the minor would not be amenable to the care, treatment and training
program available through the facilities of the juvenile court, based
upon an evaluation of the following criteria:
.(1) The degree of criminal sophisticationexhibited by the minor.
(2) Whether the minor can be rehabilitatedprior to the expiration
of the juvenile court'sjurisdiction.
(3) The minor's previous delinquent history.
(4) Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor.
(5) The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged to have
been committed by the minor...
191. The waiver statute now includes such offenses as murder, arson, armed
robbery, sex offenses with force, kidnapping, and assault with a firearm or with
force. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(b) (West Supp. 1980).
192. See id. at § 707(c).
193. Comment, Juvenile Justice in California ChangingConcepts?,7 AM. J.
Cann. LAw 171, 188 (1979). See also Note, supra note 12, at 853; Dixon, supra
note 20, at 474.
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one of the enumerated offenses. After accounting for possible
fluctuations in the rates of juvenile crime, researchers evaluating the impact of shifting the burden of proof reported, for example, that "Los Angeles County experienced a 318% increase
in certification hearings and a 234% increase in certifications"
between 1976 and 1977.194 Moreover, this evaluation found that
the juveniles who were certified to stand trial as adults were as
likely to be convicted as youths tried in juvenile court, and following their conviction, they were more likely to be incarcerated than their juvenile counterparts.195 Thus, by shifting the
burden of proof and the risk of nonpersuasion the California
Legislature increased the numbers of juveniles certified,
achieved greater equality in the administration of waiver
throughout the state, and increased the severity of sanctions
imposed upon those youths ultimately tried and convicted as
adults.
Whether the Minnesota legislation, which creates a rebuttable presumption of adulthood but leaves the burden of proof
on the prosecution, will have the same effect is uncertain. The
effect of the legislation will depend, to a considerable degree,
on the manner in which juvenile courts apply the prima facie
case guidelines and the extent to which the Minnesota
Supreme Court attempts to regulate juvenile court discretion
in cases decided on a full evidentiary record under the more
permissive subdivision two.196 The legislature directed the
Governor's Crime Control Planning Board to evaluate the impact of the new legislation; the board will compare the numbers
of waivers granted before and after its adoption and survey the
characteristics of offenders certified.197 If the net effect of the
194. TEILmANN & KLEIN, SUMMARY OF INTERIM FINDINGS OF THE ASSESSMENT
OF THE IMPACT OF CALIFORNIA'S 1977 JUvENILE JUSTICE LEGISLATION 30 (1977)
(Soc. Sci. Research Inst., U. of S. Cal.).
195. Id. at 32.
When minors are sent to criminal court, they face the same probability
of being convicted that they would face if they had remained in the juvenile court, but are a little more likely to be incarcerated as a result,
even after controlling for difference in types of offenses considered by
the two courts. About 40% of all juveniles convicted in criminal court
received non-juvenile sentences, while about 54% go to the California
Youth Authority and only 5% are not incarcerated at all. We must conclude that there has been some increase in the severity of treatment
for these juvenile felons as a result of the new law. Certainly, juveniles
arrested for 707(b) offenses face a higher risk of certification since the
law went into effect in Los Angeles County.
Id. at 34-35.
196. See MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2) (1980); notes 162-83 supra and accompanying text.
197. See MINN. STAT. § 260.125(6) (1980).
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legislation is only a marginal rural/urban shift in certification
cases, then the legislature may want to reconsider the California waiver alternative.
3.

The Legislature's Prima Facie Matrix-the Rationale and
its Implementation

The legislature's decision to make certain combinations of
present offense and prior record a prima facie case for certification raises some questions about the policy rationale for the
choices made. By using, offense rather than offender characteristics to make certification decisions, legislators relied on retributive or utilitarian justifications for punishment rather than
the traditional, rehabilitative rationale.198 A retributive rationale excludes young offenders from juvenile court jurisdiction
on the basis of the seriousness or culpability of a past offense; a
utilitarian/preventive rationale uses past offenses to predict
the likelihood of future violations and thus the need for restraint. A retributive decision can be based on the seriousness
of the present offense alone, whereas a reliable utilitarian judgment requires more extensive evidence of persistence. The
tension between past-oriented retributive decisions and futureoriented utilitarian decisions exists in virtually all offense-oriented sentencing schemes.199
This same tension is reflected in the certification matrix.2 00
198. See text accompanying notes 180-81 supra.
199. See, e.g., 1980 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 41, at 9. See generally Coffee, supra note 41; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 43.
200. Selecting the matrix criteria also entails an explicit value choice
about the quantity and quality of youthful deviance that will be tolerated within the juvenile system before a more punitive adult response
is mandated. Since youths will normally not receive better rehabilitative services in the adult correctional system than are available in the
juvenile system, the decision to transfer a youth to the adult process
must ultimately be defensible on either retributive or general prevention grounds. From the community's perspective the principal values
of exclusion are enhanced community protection through the greater
security and longer sentences available in the adult system, increased
general deterrence through the greater certainty of consequences, and
reaffirmation of fundamental societal norms regarding intolerable deviance. Since most offenders, adults and juveniles alike, do not require
penal incarceration, however, legislative exclusion is appropriate only
when an offender's past record of persistence and the seriousness of
his present offense appear to society to warrant confinement. The
value judgment as to when this situation is reached reflects a tension
between retribution and utility. While a retributive value choice might
dictate automatic exclusion of those who commit a serious, heinous offense, a choice based on utility requires that the serious offender be
excluded only if shown to be a chronic recidivist.
Feld, supra note 1, at 572.
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Exclusion solely on the basis of serious offenses against the
person or those committed with "particular cruelty" reflects the
retributive rationale, while exclusion on the basis of extensive
juvenile felony histories embodies the predictive rationale. The
legislature emphasized the seriousness of a juvenile's present
offense in constructing its matrix. The Sentencing Guidelines
Commission also used a retributive sentencing rationale in
drawing its imprisonment disposition line. Consequently, for
juveniles committing serious offenses, there is a striking parallelism between those youths whose offenses render them presumptively out of the juvenile court and those whose same
offenses and offense histories render them presumptively "in"
prison under the adult sentencing guidelines. 20 1 Thus, there is
reason to expect that the legislature's goal of significantly increasing the penalties imposed on serious juvenile offenders
will be realized for those youths committing offenses against
the person and tried as adults.
Some of the specific elements of the new Minnesota matrix
raise problems of consistency or implementation. For example,
the decision to presumptively exclude only youths over sixteen
years of age reflects existing certification practices that typically reach only older youths within the juvenile court's jurisdiction. However, the legislature has already determined that
youths aged fourteen and older "may be prosecuted for a crimi202
nal offense" following appropriate certification proceedings.
Moreover, developmental psychology research strongly supports this legislative endorsement of the common law judgment
that by age fourteen youths have acquired the requisite capacity to be responsible for their criminal acts.20 3 Thus, there is no
obvious reason for the legislature's decision to confine its prima
facie case to juveniles sixteen years of age or older. Youths
whose exclusion results from persistence-the utilitarian portion of the matrix-will probably be sixteen or older simply because it takes some time to acquire the requisite history of
prior offenses. For youths whose exclusion is rooted in the seriousness of their offenses-the retributive portion of the matrix-there is no obvious difference between a first degree
Compare MINN. STAT. § 260.125(3) (1980) with 1980 SENTENCING GUImEsupra note 41, at 38. Moreover, the sentencing guidelines apply with the
same presumptive force to certified juveniles tried as adults as they do to adult
offenders. 1980 SENTENCING GUmELNES, supra note 41, at 36.
202. MIN. STAT. § 609.055 (1980).
203. Feld, supra note 1, at 609-11, nn.307 & 308.
201.

uiNEs,
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murder committed by a fifteen-year-old and the same crime
committed by a somewhat older youth.
There are some administrative problems posed by the portion of the matrix that excludes youths committing aggravated
felonies against the person when the offense is committed with
"particular cruelty or disregard for the life or safety of another."20 4 This is an inherently vague grant of discretion within
a statute that already suffers from extreme imprecision. While
obviously distinguishable, adult certification is the "capital
punishment" of the juvenile court. Similar language in capital
punishment statutes has been found to inject an impermissible
potential for abuse into the decision-making process. 205
In Godfrey v. Georgia,20 6 the defendant was convicted of
murder and sentenced to death for the shotgun killings of his
wife and mother-in-law on the statutory ground that the offense
"'was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in
that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated
battery to the victim.' "207 The United States Supreme Court
re-emphasized its earlier holdings in Furman v. Georgiaosand
Gregg v. Georgia2O9 that punishment should not be inflicted in
an arbitrary, inconsistent, or totally discretionary fashion and
that "'discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to
minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.' "210
A plurality of the Court observed that "[a] person of ordinary
sensibility could fairly characterize almost every murder as
'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman,'"211 and
held that "[t]he petitioner's crimes cannot be said to have reflected a consciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of
any person guilty of murder."2 12 Thus, if the shotgun murder in
Godfrey could not be characterized as "outrageously or wantonly vile," would the killing in Dahl be one committed with
204. MINN. STAT. § 260.125(3) (1980).
205. See notes 206-12 infra.
206. 100 S. Ct. 1759 (1980).
207. Id. at 1762 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (7) (1978)).
208. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
209. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
210. 100 S. Ct. at 1764 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976)).
211. Id. at 1765 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978)).
212. Id. at 1767. An inflammatory dissent that dramatically and graphically
described the killings to prove that the defendant fit the statute revealed a
crime virtually indistinguishable from that committed in Dahl. Compare Godfrey v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. at 1775-76 ("[tIhe police eventually found her face
down on the floor with a substantial portion of her head missing and her brain,
no longer cabined by her skull, protruding for some distance onto the floor")
with In re Dahl, 278 N.W.2d 316, 317 (1979) ("witness described the frontal section of his head as just disappeared, gone"').
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"particular cruelty"? In the final analysis, does this legislative
standard of "particular cruelty" do anything other than encourage judicial arbitrariness by providing an inherently vague
and discretionary statute that will ultimately reflect little more
than variations in judges' revulsion?
To establish a prima facie case for waiver several subsections of subdivision three require proof of an adjudication of
one or more felony offenses "within the preceding 24 months"
in addition to the present offense. 213 The emphasis on prior felony convictions reflects the utilitarian/predictive components
of the statute and provides the most reliable basis for deciding
which juveniles are adults.214 The legislature apparently
wanted to include in its presumptive exclusion provisions only
those felonies committed by juveniles after they were fourteen
years of age, that is, when they possessed common law criminal capacity.2 15 Since both sixteen- and seventeen-year-old
youths can be certified under the provision, this legislative restriction can result in substantially different treatment of two
juveniles with identical records and offenses because of the
mere fortuity of when they happened to commit their prior
crimes. Furthermore, there is little justification for considering
only those felonies committed "within the preceding 24
months," because most studies of the development of delinquent careers consistently reveal that the length of the record,
not the time period in which the offenses are committed, is the
best indicator of probable future delinquency. 2 16 The imposition of a 24-month limitation simply introduces further arbitrariness and inconsistency in certification proceedings. Fortunately, this particular problem could be resolved by a statutory amendment specifying that the prior offenses to be considered are those committed after the youth is fourteen years of
17
age.2
Despite the legislative changes in the certification of serious juvenile offenders, two major problems remain. One problem is the requirement that a previously waived youth who
commits another offense while still a chronological juvenile
must be recertified prior to adult prosecution. 2 18 Even with
213. See, e.g., MINN.STAT. § 265.125(3) (1), -(2), -(3) (1980).
214. See notes 59-64 supra and accompanying text.
215. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
216. See notes 13 & 63 supra and accompanying text.
217. For example, the statute could be amended to read: "Has been adjudicated delinquent for an offense committed after the child was fourteen years of
age, which offense would be a felony if committed by an adult. .
218. Feld, supra note 1, at 582.
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adoption of the sentencing guidelines, recertification is likely to
2 19
occur in the case of the persistent juvenile property offender.
For example, a youth with an extensive record of juvenile felonies-burglaries, thefts, stolen automobiles, and the like-excluded from the juvenile court shortly after reaching age
sixteen could still be recertified and convicted of adult felonies
three or four times before being presumptively imprisoned as
an adult. The legislature could eliminate repetitive certification
by providing that once a juvenile is transferred to adult criminal court and convicted of an offense within the prima facie
case matrix, he or she will remain an adult for purposes of subsequent criminal prosecution.
The second problem is more fundamental. The waiver criteria of nonamenability to treatment and dangerousness are essentially broad grants of discretion incapable of even-handed
administration. 220 Most courts, recognizing the inherent ambiguity of these statutes, attempt to implement the legislature's
will. These attempts are futile, however, when the legislature
has failed to enunciate the proper function of juvenile courts
and the basis upon which a waiver decision should be made.
The most recent prima facie case reform is a tentative step toward resolving this fundamental problem. But the inclusion of
offense-based criteria within a discretionary and permissive offender-oriented statute fails to address the conceptual inade221
quacies of the statute itself.

D.

ADVERSARY NATURE AND FORMALrTY OF WAIVER HEARINGS

Two changes in the juvenile code-the application of the
rules of evidence to waiver hearings and the requirement that
juveniles receive "the effective assistance of counsel" 222-- will
make waiver hearings and other juvenile court proceedings
more lengthy, complex, formal, and adversarial.
1.

Rules of Evidence

Before the recent juvenile code amendments became effective, determinations of amenability and dangerousness were
typically based on "soft" evidence-psychological and psychiat219. See generally 1980 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 41.
220. See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text.
221. For a discussion of the criteria's inadequacies, see notes 23-64 supra
and accompanying text.
222. See MINN. STAT. § 260.155(1), -(2) (1980).
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ric testimony,223 social history reports 224 including summaries
of school records, police reports, statements of neighbors, and
the opinions of social workers and probation officers. A considerable amount of evidence in waiver hearings was hearsay and
opinion evidence not subject to confrontation or cross-examinatheoretically
tion; almost any information about the youth was
225
decision.
waiver
the
to
material"
and
"relevant
The new statute requires waiving courts to adhere to the
rules of evidence 226 and thus represents a substantial departure from past practice. The Minnesota Juvenile Code, before
the recent amendments, expressly provided that hearings
"shall be without a jury and may be conducted in an informal
manner."227 Standards of admissibility of evidence in juvenile
court hearings were traditionally relaxed because juvenile proceedings were informal and conducted before a judge rather
than a jury. The new statute will result in more formal and
time-consuming proceedings. Adherence to evidentiary rules
may also cause the exclusion of some evidence that was formerly admissible, despite the supreme court's insistence that a
waiving court should have as much evidence available to it as
possible. 228
Two recent Minnesota Supreme Court opinions reaffirmed
the court's support of relaxed evidentiary standards. In In re
S.R.J.229 the court reiterated that "a reference hearing is a dispositional hearing and the strict rules of evidence are not applicable" and held that the "appropriate test is whether the
evidence is relevant and material."230 In In re T.D.S.231 the
223. For example, in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), defense
counsel arranged for Kent's evaluation by two psychiatrists and a psychologist
who were prepared to testify on his behalf. Id. at 545. Recently, the Minnesota
Supreme Court in In re S.R.J., 293 N.W.2d 32 (Minn. 1980), established procedures by which psychiatric or psychological evaluations are to be made and
their reports used in waiver proceedings. See note 183 supra.
224. Providing defense counsel with access to the contents of the social history file was one of the due process rights guaranteed by Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. at 562. Accord, In re I.Q.S., 244 N.W.2d 30, 36 (Minn. 1976).
225. MINN. Juv. CT. R. 6-5, 8-6 (admit all "material and relevant" evidence
"including hearsay and opinion evidence") (MINN. STAT. § 480.0595 directs the
state supreme court to promulgate new juvenile court rules).
226. MINN. STAT. § 260.155(1) (1980).
227. Juvenile Court Act, ch. 685, § 22 1959 Minn. Laws 1287 (amended 1980).
228. See In re S.R.J., 293 N.W.2d 32, 35-36 (Minn. 1980); In re T.D.S., 289
N.W.2d 137, 140 (Minn. 1980); notes 229-31 supra and accompanying text.
229. 293 N.W.2d 32 (Minn. 1980).
230. Id. at 35. This holding is consistent with the recommendations of the
American Bar Association's Juvenile Justice Standards Project. See INSTITUTE
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, JUVENILE JUSTICE STAN-

DARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO DIsPOSTIONAL PROCEDURES (1980); TRANSFERS

supra note 19, § 2.2C at 39-44.
231. 289 N.W.2d 137 (Minn. 1980).
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court, upholding the admission of police officers' testimony
about their investigation and interviews with the victim and a
co-defendant, noted that
[w] hen hearsay is reliable and an opportunity to dispute it is afforded,
application of strict exclusionary rules of evidence to reference hearings would impede both the state
and the juvenile in fully advising the
232
court of relevant considerations.

Perhaps unknowingly, the legislature, in requiring adherence
to the .rules of evidence, overruled these cases and the pre-existing practices far more successfully than it overruled Dahl.233
Some of the testimony that would usually be excluded
under the rules of evidence will still be admissible if out-ofcourt declarants testify directly and are subjected to cross-examination. Although much of the information collected by probation officers in their compilations of a juvenile's social history
will also inadmissible, all of the individuals consulted may be
subpoenaed to testify directly. Adherence to the rules of evidence, however, will increase the cost of reference proceedings
and may either prolong the proceedings or force the state to
forego presentation of some of its evidence.
2.

Effective Assistance of Counsel in CertificationHearings
and in Juvenile Court Proceedings

The recent legislation also provides that a juvenile shall receive the "effective assistance of counsel" both in waiver hearings and in other juvenile court proceedings. 234 Determining
what "effective assistance of counsel" means in reference pro232. Id. at 140 (emphasis added). Having ruled that the statutes and rules
allowed the admission of the hearsay, the Minnesota Supreme Court also rejected the juvenile's claim that receipt of hearsay testimony violated his constitutional rights to confrontation and cross-examination, citing Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The court reasoned that "[s]ince there is no adjudication of guilt or innocence at the reference proceeding, the full panoply of trial rights is inapplicable." Id. at 141. The
court did not consider whether the denial of confrontation and cross-examination also denied the youth the effective assistance of counsel to which he is entitled. See note 234 infra and accompanying text.
233. See notes 65-86 supra and accompanying text.
234. MiNN. STAT. § 260.155(2) (1980). In one sense, the addition of the language "effective assistance of counsel" is redundant because juveniles have
been constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel in reference hearings
since Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966), and in delinquency adjudications since In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967). By definition, the assistance
of counsel required by these decisions must be effective, since ineffective
assistance of counsel is a constitutional violation, a deprivation of the fundamental right that those decisions recognized. See, e.g., United States v.
DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
358 (1977).
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ceedings and delinquency adjudications presents a difficult issue. This determination requires standards of conduct by
which appellate courts can review the challenged performance
of attorneys. Because "attorneys functioning in a legal system
that serves benevolent as well as punitive goals are likely to
view their role somewhat differently from attorneys acting
within the adult criminal justice system,"235- the question remains whether there should be any difference in the standards
of performance to which counsel in criminal and juvenile proceedings are held.
Whatever philosophical differences between juvenile and
adult criminal proceedings once may have existed,236 the role
of effective counsel in juvenile adjudications and waiver hearings must now be that of an adversary and an advocate comparable to the role of counsel in criminal proceedings. The
purpose of juvenile courts in Minnesota is no longer exclusively benevolent. A juvenile's prior felony adjudications now
affect his or her exclusion from juvenile court under the prima
facie case matrix. Exclusion from juvenile court results in the
loss of a variety of benefits and the far more serious consequences of an adult criminal conviction. Any juvenile felony
conviction obtained after a youth is sixteen years of age is included in the youth's adult criminal history for purposes of increasing sentences under the adult sentencing guidelines.
Given these significant consequences, "effective assistance of
counsel" necessarily requires a role much more consonant with
the criminal justice system than with the traditional, rehabilitative juvenile court.
Although a full explication of effective assistance of counsel in waiver hearings and juvenile proceedings is beyond the
scope of this Article, it is worth noting that appellate courts
have drawn on several sources to evaluate the performance of
counsel, including various American Bar Association standards237 and appellate court decisions. 238 These standards and
235. Feld, supra note 1, at 601.
236. See Kay & Segal, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court Proceedings: A Non-polar Approach, 61 GEo. L.J. 1401, 1410 (1973). See also Ferster,
Countless, & Snethen, The Juvenile Justice System: In Search of the Role of
Counsel, 39 FoRDHA-m I REV. 375 (1971).
237. The American Bar Association has promulgated certain standards that
analyze various aspects of counsel's responsibilities during the course of a
criminal trial and at the time of sentencing. See generally INsTITUr OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, AMERIcAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (1971); INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL

ADmNISTRATION, AMERIcAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING
ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES (1968). These standards have received sub-
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decisions provide a basis for determining the meaning of "effective assistance of counsel" in waiver hearings and juvenile adjudications. For example, uncounseled juveniles should not be
permitted to waive their right to the assistance of counsel 239 because the consequences of certification are substantial, the determination of a juvenile's competence to make a knowing and
intelligent waiver is problematic, and the social utility of allowing juveniles to waive counsel is minimal. 240
Once a juvenile's counsel has been appointed, the attorney
"should seek to discover at the earliest opportunity whether
transfer will be sought and, if so, the procedure and criteria according to which that determination will be made."2 41 Given
the inherent uncertainties, the breadth of the inquiry, and the
nature of the facts at issue, adequate preparation for a certification proceeding is apt to be more time-consuming and demanding than preparation for a trial.242 Counsel must be prepared to
respond to more than the factual issues surrounding the offense alleged because "the inquiry may range over the entire
social, psychological and behavioral history of the respondent. '2 43 Counsel must also become familiar with any local varstantial judicial endorsement as a test for evaluating the effectiveness of the
assistance of counsel rendered to a defendant. See, e.g., United States v.
DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Two other sets of standards further elaborate the types of assistance that counsel must render to juveniles in
order to meet the constitutional mandates of Kent and Gault. See TRANSFERS
BETWEEN COURTS STANDARDS, supra note 19; INSTITUTE OF JUDIciAL ADMINISTRATION, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS:

STANDARDS RE-

LATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES (1980) [hereinafter cited as COUNSEL
FOR JUVENILES STANDARDS].
238. The performance of counsel in juvenile proceedings has been the subject of appellate court review and supervision. See, e.g., Geboy v. Gray, 471 F.2d
575, 579-80 (7th Cir. 1973); In re T.D.S., 289 N.W.2d 137, 149 (Minn. 1980).
239. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 558 (1966); COUNSEL FOR
JUVENILES STANDARDS, supra note 237, § 8.1 at 161-63; TRANSFER BETWEEN
COURTS STANDARDS, supra note 19, § 2.3A at 45-46.
240. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806 (1975), which allowed criminal defendants to waive counsel and
proceed pro se, and the possibility that some juveniles may possess sufficient
maturity to make such a decision, the complexities of certification decisions,
the scope of the inquiry, and the extensive reliance on the expert testimony,
militate against encouraging waivers.
241. COUNSEL FOR JUVENILES STANDARDS, supra note 237, § 8.2(a) at 163.
242. [A] dded time for preparation may be even more essential in a case
involving a juvenile than in the case of the average adult offender, including "the need to investigate an entire life, to devise a plan for a
useful future," and the inability to rely on the immature judgment of
the juvenile client.
Geboy v. Gray, 471 F.2d 575, 579 (7th Cir. 1973) (quoting Miller v. Quatso, 332 F.
Supp. 1269, 1275 (E.D. Wis. 1971)).
243. COUNSEL FOR JUVENILE STANDARDS, supra note 237, § 8.2(a) at 163-65.
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iations in procedures and any informal criteria used by the
court that may affect defense strategies and planning.
To be effective, a juvenile's counsel thus must be given an
244
adequate opportunity to prepare for the extensive inquiry.
He or she should examine all of the reports, social histories,
documents, and other evidence that the state intends to introduce or on which the court may rely.245 Although a probation
officer's report to the juvenile court typically includes much of
the information needed for an amenability or dangerousness
determination, an effective attorney will independently investigate the information contained in the social history in order to
supplement or correct it.246 An effective attorney should employ an independent psychiatrist or psychologist to help evaluate the evidence if such aid appears warranted. 247 In addition
to securing an independent expert witness to examine the
youth and preparing the expert witness to testify, the attorney
should also investigate the range of available treatment and security facilities in order to offer the court an alternative to
2 48
waiver.
Following the adoption of the rules of evidence, a waiver
hearing is in every sense a formal, trial-like proceeding. Thus,
at the time of the transfer hearing "it is the lawyer's duty to
make all motions, objections or requests necessary to the protection of the client's rights in such form and at such time as
244. See Geboy v. Gray, 471 F.2d 575, 579 (7th Cir. 1973); cf.Haziel v. United
States, 404 F.2d 1275, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (the child's advocate must fully investigate the alternatives to waiver).
245. COUNSEL FOR JUVENILES STANDARDS,supra note 237, § 8.2(b) at 165.
246. Id. Counsel is obliged to supplement the reports when incomplete and
challenge them when inaccurate. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 563
(1966).
247. The Institute of Judicial Administration has commented on the importance of independent psychological evaluations in transfer proceedings:
Since the respondent's mental condition is always relevant to and
sometimes determinative of the appropriateness of transfer, representation at this stage will frequently demand presentation of expert opinion on the client's behalf. While clinical services may be available at or
through the court, the tendency of psychiatrists and psychologists who
work frequently with judges and probation officers to adjust their evaluations to the known views of those with whom they deal has been
well established. The lawyer should, therefore, also be prepared to
seek appointment of independent psychiatric or psychological witnesses where that course seems warranted. Consultation with an independent expert will provide counsel with knowledge concerning the
child and his or her condition which can contribute significantly to effective examination of prosecution evidence and, possibly, a source of
qualified rebuttal evidence on the child's behalf.
COUNSEL FOR JUVENILES STANDARDS, upra note 237, § 8.2(b) at 166 (citations
omitted).
248. See In re T.D.S., 289 N.W.2d 137, 141 (Minn. 1980).
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will best serve the client's legitimate interests at trial or on appeal."24 9 In addition, counsel's effective representation of a juvenile's interests may also require the lawyer to rigorously
cross-examine witnesses and court personnel. 250 Some courts
have, however, suggested that counsel in waiver hearings
should only present evidence that will aid the court in its decision and not "denigrate the [social services] staffs submissions
and recommendations." 25 1 Indeed, many juvenile court judges
tend to be protective of their social services personnel and are
disinclined to subject them to effective cross-examination.
Such a defensive posture, however, was clearly rejected by the
Supreme Court in Kent v. United States:
[Ilf the staffs submissions include materials which are susceptible to
challenge or impeachment, it is precisely the role of counsel to "denigrate" such matter. There is no irrebuttable presumption of accuracy
attached to staff reports. If a decision on waiver is "critically important" it is equally of "critical importance" that the material submitted
to the judge ... be subjected, within reasonable limits having regard
to the theory2 of the Juvenile Court Act, to examination, criticism and
25
refutation.

Although regular juvenile practitioners may be reluctant to
jeopardize their relationships with the juvenile courts by subjecting social services personnel to searching scrutiny, "[i]t is
unprofessional conduct for counsel knowingly to forego or limit
examination of a witness when it is obvious that failure to ex'2 53
amine fully will prejudice the client's legitimate interests.
Counsel also has the responsibility to minimize the influence improper considerations have on the determination.
Many waivers are sought on the basis of a very visible or sensational offense that has aroused strong public opinion and
249. COUNSEL FOR JUVENILES STANDARDS, supra note 237, § 7.2 at 136.
[C] ounsel has the duty to protect the client's interests by every lawful
means, including resort to ordinary principles of proof and disproof.
Counsel should, of course, exercise professional judgment in deciding
whether to challenge any given question or offer of evidence, and failure formally to raise an objection is often consistent with sound trial
strategy rather than abandonment of responsibility. As in every other
situation, however, counsel's professional judgment must be exercised
in the client's interests. When evidence is offered or a ruling made that
the lawyer considers prejudicial to the client's interest and there exists
a good faith basis for challenge, the attorney is obliged to make proper
objection, not only for purposes of informing the trial judge but also for
appellate purposes.
Id. § 7.4(b) at 14344.
250. Id. § 7.8(a) at 149.
251. Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1964), rev'd, 383 U.S.
541 (1966).
252. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 563 (1966).
253. COUNSEL FOR JUVENILES STANDARDS, supra note 237, § 7.8(a) at 149.
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thereby created almost irrestible pressures on the court. Counsel must neutralize the court's tendency to "sacrifice" a youth
2 54
in order to avoid ensuing scandal.
The provision for effective assistance of counsel is not confined to waiver hearings, but applies to delinquency determinations within the juvenile court as well. The requirement that
juveniles be effectively assisted by counsel in adjudications has
important implications for the role of counsel when representing juveniles in these proceedings. A youth's offense history is
now significant for two reasons: it may cause the presumptive
exclusion of the youth from juvenile court jurisdiction, and it is
a liability if the youth is sentenced as an adult. The effect of
sustained or admitted felonies in both contexts should encourage attorneys to defend more aggressively the legal interests of their young clients. 255 Because of the cumulative impact
of felony convictions, attorneys representing juveniles must
consider not only the probable disposition on the basis of the
present charge but also the collateral consequences of an admission or conviction for subsequent adjudications.
This increased significance of offenses will influence defense attorneys both in their litigation strategies and their plea
254. See Comment, Representing the Juvenile Defendant in Waiver Proceedings, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 424, 437-38 (1968). One writer has observed that
Community fear and outrage in the wake of dramatic increases in violent crimes by juveniles as well as the influence of "law and order" political leaders are undeniably factors which intrude upon the fitness
decisions of the juvenile courts. This is true whether a judge shares
public sentiments or simply seeks to divert pressure from the entire juvenile justice system by sacrificing the most serious of delinquents
through transfer to the criminal courts.
Comment, supra note 49, at 1008-09.
255. The cooptation of defense attorneys in adult criminal proceedings has
been analyzed in Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptationof a Profession,1 L. & Soc'y REV. 51 (1967). Blumberg argues that institutional pressures and the desire to maintain stable relationships
with judges and other personnel thwart effective advocacy. Defense attorneys
become dependent on prosecutors' and judges' cooperation. Conversely, prosecutors and judges depend on defense attorneys to cooperate in order to expedite a large number of cases in a short period of time. Consequently, the
system becomes one of informal relationships in which the maintenance of organizational stability may be more important than the representation of any
given client. This analysis has been applied to juvenile court attorneys. See A.
PLATr, supra note 3, at 163-75. See generally Duffee & Siegel, The Organization
Man: Legal Counsel in the Juvenile Court, 7 Cram. L. BULL. 544 (1971); Platt &
Friedman, The Limits of Advocacy: OccupationalHazards in Juvenile Court,
116 U. PA. L. REV. 1156 (1968). Resistance of cooperative pressures through adversarial representation is one of the underlying assumptions of the American
Bar Association's standards, see COUNSEL FOR JUVENILES STANDARDS, supra
note 237.
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bargaining practices. 25 6 With the significance of prior felony offenses, amplified by the prima facie case matrix and the sentencing guidelines, both prosecutors and defense attorneys
may find themselves constrained in their negotiating flexibility
and forced to resolve more cases by litigation.
An attorney representing a juvenile with one or two prior
felony adjudications should almost automatically litigate every
subsequent felony allegation unless the prosecutor will accept
a plea to a misdemeanor. A juvenile has an absolute right to
put the state to its proof, and a defense strategy based solely
on the possibility that a critical witness will not appear or that
the juvenile will only be convicted of a lesser included misdemeanor is a preferable tactic to adding another felony conviction to the running total. Traditionally, juvenile courts, unlike
adult criminal courts, have not varied their dispositions on the
basis of whether the defendant was adjudicated a delinquent or
had entered an admission to the petition. 257 It is arguably per
se ineffective assistance of counsel if an attorney advises a juvenile to plead guilty to a felony when the juvenile has been
found guilty of two prior felonies because any subsequent felony allegation, regardless of its ultimate merit, establishes a
prima facie case for prosecution as an adult.
E.

DISPOSITION OF SERIOUS YOUNG OFFENDERS AS JUVENILES
AND ADULTS-TOwARD AN INTEGRATED SENTENCING
SYSTEM

Ultimately, the issue of certification is a question of the appropriate dispositions of serious young offenders who happen
to be chronological juveniles. The traditional distinction between "treatment" as a juvenile and "punishment" as an adult
is based on an arbitrarily drawn line that has no criminological
significance other than its legal consequences. The inconsistencies between the juvenile and adult systems often make futile any attempt to rationalize social control and the response
to serious youthful deviance. These inconsistencies arise from
the legislative failure to recognize that children are constantly
256. Under the present practice, there is no necessary relationship between the offense for which a juvenile pleads or is adjudicated a delinquent and the ultimate disposition. As a consequence, there is a
relatively cavalier attitude on the part of prosecutors and defense attorneys in plea bargaining, since an admission of even one offense provides the court with all the legal authority it needs for maximum
intervention.
Feld, supra note 1, at 607.
257. P. STRASBURG, supra note 1, at 90.
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maturing; they are not irresponsible children one day and responsible adults the next, except as a matter of law.258 Moreover, there is a strong correlation between age and criminal
activity with the rates of many kinds of criminal involvements
peaking in mid-adolescence. 25 9 The continuation of the artificial juvenile/adult dichotimization has resulted in a disservice
to the public safety.2 60 The new Minnesota legislation and sentencing guidelines reveal the first, tentative moves toward the
goal of integrated and rational sentencing policy, but further
changes are needed before the goal can be attained.
1.

Dispositionsof Juveniles as Juveniles

One provision of the revised juvenile code that governs disposition of juvenile offenders will directly affect certification. A
new code section allows juvenile courts to "require the child to
pay a fine of up to $500."261 Rural courts that had previously
certified juveniles in order to impose "adult" fine dispositions
in misdemeanor cases,2 62 are now authorized to fine juveniles
without resort to the subterfuge of an adult certification. 2 63 Although the United States Supreme Court, in Baldwin v. New
York, 264 allowed the imposition of fines for "petty offenses"
258. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
259. See note 63 supra and accompanying text. See also FBI CRIME REPORTS, supra note 8, at 194-96.
260. See CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME, supra note 1, at 5; Boland & Wilson,
supra note 9 at 29-32; Boland, Fighting Crime: The Problem of Adolescents, 71 J.
CR IM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY 94, 96-97 (1980).
261. MINN. STAT. § 260.135 (1) (f) (1980). See text accompanying notes 104-05
supra.
262. See SUPREME COURT STUDY, supra note 53, at 21.
263. Most of the courts imposing such fines were in rural areas. See note 53
supra. The availability of fining power in juvenile court and the less serious
crime problems experienced in rural counties should result in certification becoming an almost exclusively urban county phenomenon under the presumptive exclusion provisions. Zimring reports that
[t]o the extent that official statistics mirror reality, serious youth violence occurs more often in cities than in non-urban areas, involves
boys far more frequently than girls, and is concentrated among low social status, ghetto-dwelling urban youth .... Offenses of violence,
particularly robbery, are intensely concentrated in the nation's large
cities.
Zimring, supra note 6, at 83-84. This observation is consistent with the findings
of the Minnesota Supreme Court's Juvenile Justice Study Commission which
found that urban offenders considered for certification had committed more serious offenses and had more extensive prior records than their rural counterparts. SUPREME COURT STUDY, supra note 53, at 66, 67, 68, tables 5, 6, 7, 8. It also
found that certified urban youths had longer records compiled over longer periods of time and resulting in more juvenile court appearances than did rural
youths. Id. at 68, table 8-9.
264. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
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without a jury trial,2 6 5 the propriety of expanding the fining
power of juvenile courts is questionable.
At the same time that the legislature granted juvenile
courts the authority to levy fines, the Minnesota Department of
Corrections administratively implemented a plan providing for
determinate sentences in juvenile institutions based on a juvenile's present offense and prior record.266 In part, the decision
to implement a determinate sentencing system reflects the
inadequacies and inequities of individualized treatment dispositions. An evaluation of commitment and release decisionmaking in juvenile correctional institutions in Minnesota
concluded that:
There is no relationship between the juvenile's offense and the disposition of his case at either the State Training School or the Minnesota
Home School.
Status offenders stay slightly longer in the institutions than serious
offenders .... Juveniles at the State Training School stay longer than
juveniles at the other two institutions.
All in all, there are no consistent or systematic criteria used in
making decisions267about whether or not to institutionalize and when to
parole juveniles.

The study found that commitment and release decisions were
so "individualized" that no factors explained the behavior of institutional staff in their handling of different youths. 268 There
was no relationship between the most serious offenses in
juveniles' files and their dispositions; 269 the most significant variable affecting the length of youths' incarceration was the institution to which they were committed.270 Studies in other
jurisdictions have also discovered that within a nominally "indeterminate" juvenile sentencing system incarcerated youths
serve "fixed sentences" based on the institutions to which they
are committed. The studies conclude that a pattern of uniformity in sentences, rather than individualized differentiation,
265. Id. at 70-74; see notes 110-36 and accompanying text.

266. MINNESOTA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, JUVENILE RELEASE GUIDELINEs 3
(1980). The new guidelines are intended to "provide a more definite and distinct relationship between offense and the amount of time required to bring
about positive behavior change." Id. at 2. A juvenile's length of stay is calculated on the basis of the severity of the most serious committing offense and a
weighing of "risk of failure" factors that are "predictive to some degree of future delinquent behavior." Id. at 3. Prior felony adjudications and probation
and parole failures are among the recidivism risk factors considered. Id.at 5.
267. D. CHEIN, DECISION MAKING IN JUVENILE CORRECTIONS INSTITUTIONS 1
(1976).
268. Id. at 35.
269. Id. at 33.
270. Id. at 37.
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prevails in such institutions.2 71 Thus, the Department of Corrections' decision to implement presumptive determinate
sentences, which are similar to those mandated by the adult
sentencing guidelines, introduces greater "individualization" of
dispositions than the former 'therapeutic" regime. The decision is clearly a step toward rationality and justice, albeit a departure from the "rehabilitative" tradition.
2.

Dispositionsof Serious Young Offenders as Adults-the
Impact of Sentencing Guidelines

An amendment to the code requires juvenile courts to preserve juveniles' offense records until the offenders reach
twenty-three years of age and to share those records with other
juvenile and adult sentencing courts. 272 With the increased significance of juvenile felony convictions, access to juvenile criminal records is necessary both for juvenile courts to implement
the prima facie matrix and for adult sentencing authorities to
calculate an offender's juvenile criminal history. The decision
of the Sentencing Guidelines Commission to include juvenile
felony convictions within the adult criminal history was a significant step toward developing an integrated sentencing policy
273
for serious young offenders.
The use of prior juvenile convictions in adult sentencing
decisions is a policy followed in many jurisdictions. 274 The
271. G. WHEELER,

COUNTER-DETERRENCE: A REPORT ON JUVENILE SENTENC-

AND EFFECTS OF PRISONIZATION 36 (1978).
272. MINN. STAT. § 260.161(1) (1980). See text accompanying note 109 supra.
Although confidentiality traditionally was presumed to protect the delinquent
from stigma, the policy was frequently breached. See Chashman, Confidentiality of Juvenile Court Proceedings: A Review, Vol. 24, No. 2 Juv. JUST. 30, 34-35
ING

(1973). See INSTrrTUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE RECORDS AND IN-

FORMATION SYSTEMS § 2.1 at 44-46 (1980).
273. Effective May 1, 1980, Minnesota adopted a system based on presumptive, determinate sentencing guidelines that govern both the dispositional decision-whether or not to imprison an offender-and the durational decision-for
how long to imprison. See 1980 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 41, at 8-11.
Both of these decisions--disposition and duration--are determined by reference to a matrix-a two-dimensional grid integrating the seriousness of the current offense and the extensiveness of the prior criminal history. Id. at 27-29, 38.
For purposes of this analysis, the most significant aspect of the presumptive
sentencing guidelines is the decision to include up to two juvenile felony adjudications occurring after an offender's sixteenth birthday for a maximum of one
point in the adult criminal history score. Id. at 29. Juvenile felony convictions
are used for adult sentencing purposes until the offender is 21 years old. Id.
274. See, e.g., People v. McFarlin, 389 Mich. 557, 575, 208 N.W.2d 504, 514
(1973); Annot., 64 A.L.J.3d 1291, 1295-1304 (Supp. 1980).
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Minnesota Supreme Court, in State v. Johnson,75 approved the
consideration of a juvenile record in the sentencing of an adult
offender: "[w] e see nothing improper in the court's taking into
consideration the past conduct of a juvenile in determining
what sentence could be proper. How else could he evaluate the
past performance of a juvenile who had been in trouble before
he came before the court?" 276 Similarly, prior juvenile convictions were relied upon in several adult sentencing cases in
which the United States Supreme Court upheld the propriety
277
of the sentences imposed.
Prior to the amendments,2 78 there had been questions
about the availability of a youth's juvenile court records to certifying courts and adult sentencing authorities; the recent
amendments clarify juvenile courts' responsibility to retain and
disclose these records. The Sentencing Guidelines Commission's decision to include juvenile felony convictions in an
adult criminal history score was predicated on several substantial policy considerations. The commission initially found that
including such information was consistent with existing adult
sentencing practices, especially in the urban counties of the
state.2 79 By recommending the record disclosure amendment,
the commission intended to insure that records of serious and
persistent juvenile offenders would be readily available for use
280
by sentencing authorities under a standardized procedure.
The commission chose to include in the sentencing framework features of incapacitation, which focus on persistence of
criminal activity, as well as features of "just deserts," which focus on the seriousness of criminal activity. 281 A pattern of
275. 299 Minn. 143, 216 N.W.2d 904 (1974).
276. Id. at 148, 216 N.W.2d at 908.
277. See, e.g., Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489, 490 (1969) (judge read
sentencing report that included juvenile offenses prior to the jury's finding of
guilt); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 451, 457 (1962) (sentencing under habitual
criminal statute). See also United States v. Simon, 488 F.2d 1094, 1095 (8th Cir.
1973). But see Grant v. White, 579 F.2d 48, 49 (8th Cir. 1978).
278. MINN. STAT. § 260.161(2) (1978) states that the records of juvenile court
are not open to inspection and their contents cannot be disclosed without a
court order. MINN. STAT. § 260.211(2) (1978) (repealed 1980) further stated that
the juvenile court is not precluded from disclosing information to the proper
persons "if the court considers such disclosure to be in the best interests of the
child or of the administration of justice." Juvenile court records that are not
sealed under MINN. R. Juv. CT. 11-3 are authorized to be released by MINN. IL
JUv. CT. 11-2(2) (MINN. STAT. § 480.0595 directs the state supreme court to promulgate new juvenile court rules).
279. 1980 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 41, at 7-8, 22-24.
280. Id.
281. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
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criminal violations is reliable evidence of persistence, regardless of whether it occurs while the offender is a juvenile or an
adult. Thus, the commission decided to "identify only those
whose juvenile record included repetitive felony-type adjudications, which occurred during the last two years of their minority, and which would be considered only during the first three
' 2
years of their majority. 82
The commission's decision to include juvenile felony adjudications in adult criminal history scores was made after substantial deliberation and despite considerable opposition from
some juvenile court judges. Although the inclusion of juvenile
felony adjudications helps to pass information from the juvenile courts to adult sentencing authorities, the decision to include only a limited number of offenses with a set maximum of
one point in the criminal history score impedes the development of a rational criminal sentencing policy.
The need to focus maximum intervention and criminal
sanctions on the most active and persistent offenders calls for
inclusion and equal weighting of all juvenile felony adjudications in the adult criminal history.2 83 Adolescents pose a serious street crime problem. 284 Juveniles are disproportionately
involved in criminal activity and their involvement in serious
285
crime is increasing faster than the rates of crime in general.
Moreover, there is increasing evidence that a relatively small
subset of the youthful population-those youths with five or
more criminal involvements-accounts for a disproportionately
large amount of the total serious violent and repetitive property
crime. 2 86 The age at which a youth becomes a chronic, persistent, and therefore serious offender, is somewhere in the midto late teens. 2 87 Thus, the evidence suggests that youths become chronic offenders in their mid-teens, persist in criminal
activity into their mid-twenties, and then gradually reduce their
282. A. VON HmscH, supra note 43, at 24.
283. Crime rates are high not because large numbers of people commit
one or two crimes in a lifetime but because a relatively small number
of people are habitual offenders ... Most crime is committed by offenders when they are young, either as juveniles or young adults. Currently, the criminal justice system is not organized to restrain active
young offenders.
Boland, supra note 260, at 94.
284. See CONFROINGa YoUTr CRmE, supra note 1, at 3; F.B.L CRIME REPORTS, supra note 8, at 194-96; Zimring, supra note 6, at 67-68.
285. See notes 6 & 13 supra and accompanying text.
286. See notes 6, 9, 13, 63 supra.
287. Id. (approximately 14 to 19 years old).
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rates of involvement. 288
Despite this well-documented pattern of criminal career
development, criminal sentencing policies have tended to maximize sanctions on older offenders whose criminal activity is declining while withholding sanctions from chronic younger
offenders when their rate of activity is increasing. 289 The punishment gap-the failure to maximize intervention in the lives
of chronic and active criminal offenders-occurs because of the
failure to integrate juvenile and adult criminal records for sentencing purposes. Adult criminal courts tend to rely on the seriousness of the present offense and the prior adult criminal
history when making sentencing decisions. 290 The failure to include the juvenile component of the adult offender's criminal
history stems from the confidential nature of juvenile court
records, 291 the functional and physical separation of the respective court services staffs, 292 and the sheer bureaucratic ineptitude that makes the maintenance of an integrated offender
tracking system and criminal history data set extremely difficult.2 93 When persistent juvenile offenders appear in adult

criminal court for the first time, they are all too frequently
treated as "instant virgins"--adult first-offenders-and entitled
to all of the leniency typically accorded first-offenders. 294
The failure of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission to integrate fully the juvenile and adult records for
sentencing purposes perpetuates the gap in intervention exactly at the peak of chronic and serious activity.295 Except for

youths who are imprisoned as adults solely on the basis of a
present offense against the person, 296 the inclusion of the juvenile criminal history will not result in presumptive incarceration of a chronic young burglar or thief until he or she has
committed at least two additional adult felonies, and even then
only if those convictions occur before the age of twenty-one. 297
288. Id.
289. See Boland, supra note 260, at 94.
290. See IN-TNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY
ANALYSIS OF SENTENCING AND RELEASING DATA 2-3 (Oct. 1979). See generally
1980 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 41.
291. See note 278 supra.
292. See generally Boland, supra note 260.

293.

See id.

294. See generally 1980 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 41.
295. See note 288 supra and accompanying text.
296. Youths can be imprisoned as adults solely on the basis of one present
offense against the person that mandates incarceration on a 'Just deserts" basis. See 1980 SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 41, at 9.
297. Id. at 38.
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If the adult felonies occur after twenty-one, the juvenile history
is ignored, and the pattern of "imprisoning offenders when
their criminal activity is low and falling rather than high and
rising"2 98 is perpetuated. Moreover, under the sentencing
guidelines a juvenile with only two juvenile felony convictions
is treated the same way as a juvenile with ten felony convictions, even though persistence is the most reliable indicator of
probable recidivism and seriousness.
3.

Enhanced Punishments on the Basis of Uncounseled
Juvenile Convictions-The Implications of Baldasar
and Burgett

Apart from the policy rationale for using prior juvenile convictions to enhance penalties in both certification and adult
sentences, there is a separate legal issue regarding the use of
prior convictions. In a formal legal sense, there is virtual parity
between juvenile and adult convictions.
Like adults, juveniles are entitled to due process in delinquency adjudications, 2 99 and the state is required to establish
their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.300 Although juveniles
have no right to jury trials, the Supreme Court has stated that
a juvenile judge's factual determinations are as reliable as a
jury's. 30 1 Because of the parity between juvenile and adult adjudications, there is no inherent impropriety in using juvenile
felony convictions both to exclude youths from the juvenile
02
court and to punish them under an adult sentencing scheme.
There is, however, a substantial problem with using prior
convictions to enhance subsequent penalties if the prior convictions were obtained without the assistance of counsel or an adequate waiver

of counsel.

In

Baldasar v.

Illinois, 30

3

the

defendant was denied the assistance of counsel, convicted of a
misdemeanor, and fined and placed on probation.3 04 In an earlier case,305 the United States Supreme Court had held such a
practice to be constitutionally valid if the uncounseled convic298. Boland & Wilson, supra note 9, at 29.
299. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967).
300. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
301. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1970).
302. Although McKeiver may have been wrongly decided, the decision reflects the Supreme Court's belief that juvenile adjudications are the functional
equivalent of adult determinations. See id.; notes 113-18 supra and accompanying text. See also Feld, supra note 1, at 601-05.
303. 100 S.Ct. 1585 (1980).
304. Id. at 1586.
305. Scott v. fllinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
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tion did not result in incarceration. In Baldasar,however, the
defendant was convicted a second time for a similar offense,
and under an enhanced penalty statute, the prior uncounseled
conviction was used to convert the second conviction into a felony for which the defendant was imprisoned. In a per curiam
opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the defendant's felony
conviction. 3 06 Justice Stewart condemned the increased penalty, noting that the defendant "was sentenced to an increased
term of imprisonment only because he had been convicted in a
previous prosecution in which he had not had the assistance of
appointed counsel in his defense." 30 7 Justice Marshall stated
that a defendant's "prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction
could not be used collaterally to impose an increased term of
imprisonment upon a subsequent conviction." 308 The Court's
decision in Baldasaris consistent with an earlier line of cases
that had held that an uncounseled felony conviction could not
be used in a later trial to enhance punishments under recidivist
statutes. 3 09 In Burgett v. Texas,3 10 the Supreme Court noted
that because it was unconstitutional to convict a person for a
felony without benefit of a lawyer or the valid waiver of that
benefit,
[t]o permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright
to be used against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense ... is to erode the principle of that case.
Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the
right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation
311
of that Sixth Amendment right.

Although In re Gault extended the sixth amendment right
to counsel to juveniles, 312 many juveniles in Minnesota are still
routinely adjudicated, or enter guilty pleas, without the assistance of counsel, an opportunity to consult with counsel, or a
valid waiver of counsel. 3 13 It has been estimated that as many
as twenty-five percent of the juveniles in Hennepin Countythe county with the state's most systematic juvenile legal services delivery system-routinely plead guilty at their arraignments without consulting counsel or making a "knowing and
intelligent" waiver, and that an even greater proportion of
306. 100 S. Ct. at 1586.
307. Id. at 1587 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
308. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
309. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448 (1972); Burgett v. Texas,
389 U.S. 109, 114 (1967).
310. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
311. Id. at 115.
312. See note 183 supra and accompanying text.
313. Minneapolis Tribune, Apr. 20, 1980, at A, col. 2.
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juveniles in other parts of the state enter pleas without the
314
assistance of counsel or a valid waiver.
Before juvenile felony convictions can be used to enhance
punishment, both under the presumptive exclusion matrix and
the adult sentencing guidelines, it must be established that the
prior convictions were validly obtained. An extraordinarily
heavy burden is imposed upon a juvenile court judge to determine if a juvenile's waiver of counsel is intelligently made with
knowledge that the plea could be used for subsequent certification and adult sentencing purposes. 315 Given the significance
of felony convictions, if a defense attorney acquiesces in a juvenile's waiver of counsel he or she may not be effectively assisting the juvenile. Moreover, because the prima facie matrix
applies to convictions obtained prior to August 1, 1980,316 defense counsel must be prepared to challenge the introduction
of past felony convictions. To maximize social control of chronic juvenile offenders, prosecutors should be wary of waivers of
counsel that may later render convictions invalid for purposes
of certification and adult sentencing.
V. CONSEQUENCES AND CONCLUSIONSDISMANTLING THE "REHABILITATIVE IDEAL"
Despite the extensive changes it made, the Minnesota Legislature must be faulted for failing to address the fundamental
inadequacies of the waiver criteria-amenability to treatment
and dangerousness. While the prima facie case option may facilitate more certifications, most cases will continue to be resolved by a prediction of a juvenile's amenability to treatment
or dangerousness based on a greatly expanded court record.
The legislature's insistence that juvenile courts address and answer these inherently unanswerable questions is the continuing and fundamental flaw of the entire legislative scheme.
Requiring courts to collect clinical, psychological, and social
data, which ultimately has only marginal utility in making
predictive determinations, forces judges to engage in standardless, arbitrary, and discretionary decisionmaking. Adopting a
prima facie case standard or shifting the burden of proof does
not resolve the problems posed by the inherently vague waiver
criteria. Thus, the futility of using waiver standards that re314.
315.
316.

Id.
See MNN. STAT. § 260.155(8) (1980).
See note 99 supra.
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quire essentially subjective decisions based on soft evidence
and inadequate predictors remains.
Although any conclusive assessment of the impact of the
juvenile code revisions will require additional research, certain
consequences seem likely. Because of the prima facie case offense matrix, a substantial increase in the number of motions
for adult reference can be expected. If the Minnesota Supreme
Court construes the prima facie language to permit a waiver
based simply on a showing of various combinations of present
offense and prior record, there will probably be an increase in
the number of youths actually certified for adult prosecution.
Because serious juvenile offenders are concentrated in urban
areas, most of the youths certified under the new matrix will be
residents of the state's urban counties. Many of the rural
youths previously waived for minor offenses will probably remain under the juvenile court jurisdiction where juvenile
courts will exercise their new power to levy fines. Fortunately,
the legislature has directed the Governor's Crime Control Planning Board to evaluate the impact of this legislation, and the
board's assessment of changes in certification practices will be
available in 1982.
The legislative revisions will have an impact on other aspects of juvenile justice administration as well. Substantially
more juvenile felony cases will probably go to trial. The increased litigation will stem from two sources: the implications
of every juvenile felony determination for the prima facie offense matrix, and the inclusion of juvenile felony convictions
within the sentencing guidelines' criminal history score. Since
every felony counts within the matrix and a cumulation of felonies alone can ultimately result in exclusion, it can be expected
that effective defense counsel will seldom allow clients to plead
guilty to felonies; counsel will either insist on reduced charges
or go to trial in hopes of acquittals, dismissals, or convictions
on lesser included offenses. Similarly, the inclusion of juvenile
felony convictions within the offense history score of the adult
sentencing guidelines provides an additional impetus for defense counsel to resist juvenile convictions. Juvenile felony
convictions will increase both the likelihood of eventual adult
prosecution and the probability of adult incarceration.
The serious consequences of juvenile convictions should
encourage defense counsel to provide the effective assistance
mandated by the legislature. Although the ultimate meaning of
"effective assistance" awaits judicial clarification, the expan-
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sion of defendants' rights to effective counsel, the increasingly
higher standards set by appellate courts, and the availability of
standards promulgated by the American Bar Association suggest some probable directions. The clear implication is that effective counsel will have to prepare more thoroughly for waiver
hearings and other juvenile court adjudications. Furthermore,
juvenile felony convictions that are obtained in the absence of
defense counsel or an effective waiver of counsel may not be
used in making waiver decisions or determining adult
sentences.
The legislature's juvenile code revisions may focus more of
the system's scarce resources on serious juvenile offenders.
This will reinforce the development of a two-track juvenile justice system, with a primary emphasis on formal adjudication of
serious juvenile offenders while minor offenders are handled
informally, if at all. Indeed, if most delinquency is spontaneously outgrown, a rationing system encouraging nonintervention is salutory.
The increased litigation generally will be more complex,
time-consuming, and formal. This is partly a function of the expanded presence of lawyers and their responsibilities to
juveniles, in both waiver proceedings and felony adjudications.
Because the burden of persuasion will remain on the prosecution despite proof of a prima facie case, defense counsel will be
encouraged to introduce more extensive social histories and
other forms of rebuttal evidence. Finally, the application of the
rules of evidence to waiver and adjudicative hearings will further expand the role of attorneys in juvenile litigation and will
increase the complexity, costs, and time associated with juvenile court proceedings.
These developments raise the further question of whether
juveniles should be tried by jury, at least in felony adjudications. The legislative and administrative reforms will probably
create more formal and adversarial juvenile court proceedings
and will force greater emphasis on the more serious juvenile offenders. The revisions will have implications for adjudicative
and waiver hearings, adult criminal sentences, determinate dispositions in juvenile correctional facilities, and the very purpose of the juvenile code. Viewed as a whole, the revisions
eliminate almost all remaining distinctions between juvenile
and adult criminal proceedings. Except for the absence of jury
trials, juvenile court proceedings now encompass all of the
trappings of a criminal prosecution. The ramifications of juve-
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nile felony convictions for eventual adult waiver and adult
sentences make juvenile adjudications far more significant than
they had been previously. The use of determinate sentences in
juvenile institutions, based on the present offense and prior
record, calls into question the "therapeutic" rationale of juvenile dispositions. Moreover, the juvenile code's revised purpose
clause, with its greater emphasis on the integrity of the substantive criminal law, eliminates even rhetorical support for the
traditional rehabilitative goals of juvenile justice. Whether
Minnesota can still deny jury trials to juveniles because they
are being "rehabilitated" within the juvenile justice system is a
question that remains unanswered.
The question of jury trials suggests another inquiry: When
is a juvenile court still a juvenile court? If juvenile proceedings
are now criminal prosecutions in all but name and if juries
should thus be provided, there seems to be little justification
for maintaining a separate juvenile justice system. Is there any
reason not to try all offenders, regardless of age, in district
court with full procedural safeguards? Following conviction in
district court, juvenile offenders could receive appropriate dispositions on the bases of present offenses, criminal history, age,
and availability of appropriate facilities. The new reality of the
juvenile and criminal justice systems is a virtual convergence
in procedure and substance. In light of the many real similarities, not the nominal differences, there is scant reason to persist in the fiction of a separate, and ultimately second-class,
juvenile adjudicative process.

